The Pope at War, page 67
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 18
Pirelli 1984, pp. 418–23, diary entry for March 26, 1943.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 19
The Italian embassy at the Holy See highlighted the latest of these in early April, in an article that appeared in the Roman Catholic daily featuring patriotic Easter messages sent by two of Italy’s bishops. “While our glorious army is mobilized,” said the Sicilian bishop of Trapani, “not every citizen can be a combatant. Everyone however must contribute to the victory…. This is exactly what Catholic Action wants so that the Reign of Christ is consolidated in the new Europe.” Circolare Gabinetto Ministero dell’Interno al prefetto di Verona, February 4, 1943, ACS, DAGR, A5G, IIGM, b. 27; Ambasciata alla Santa Sede to Ministry of Popular Culture, April 8, 1943, tel. 1124, ASDMAE, APSS, b. 68. The quotes are from the April 2 issue of L’Avvenire.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 20
De Felice 1996b, p. 941; Davis 2006, p. 89. Among the reports used here are several found in ACS, MI, MAT, b. 239.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 21
Maglione notes, April 6, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 163. Tardini also met with Osborne before his departure for London and criticized the Allies’ demand that Italy surrender unconditionally, saying it would be too humiliating for Italy to accept. At the same time, he told Osborne that the Allies should not put any faith in Italy’s political exiles, as not only were they out of touch with the reality of life in Italy, but they were animated by a desire for revenge. Tardini recalled that meeting more than a year later in a note dated September 4, 1944, ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte I, Italia, posiz. 1356, ff. 5r–8r.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 22
Chapter 27: A Thorny Problem
Roncalli telegram, March 13, 1943, ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Turchia, posiz. 223 II, f. 143. The ellipsis is found in the original text.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 1
Di Meglio held the title of “Addetto” in the first section (relations with states) of the Vatican’s Secretariat of State. Annuario Pontificio, 1943, p. 618.
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The ellipsis is in the original document.
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Di Meglio attributed British support for settling Jews in Palestine to the fact that England “is filo-Semitic and, at least in its roots, anti-Catholic.” He added, “The English government cannot ignore that giving Palestine to the Jews represents a favoritism toward them and an affront to the detriment of Catholicism.” Di Meglio’s mid-March 1943 report and Tardini’s notes dated April 13 are found at ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Turchia, posiz. 223 II, ff. 223–233c.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 4
Maglione telegram to Roncalli, Istanbul, May 4, 1943, with handwritten note, “approved by the Holy Father,” ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Turchia, posiz. 223 II, f. 144.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 5
Roncalli telegram, Istanbul, May 31, 1943, and Dell’Acqua typed note on it, June 1, 1943, ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Serie Turchia, posiz. 223 II, f. 146.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 6
Among the recent reports on the ongoing slaughter of Europe’s Jews were those coming from the Polish ambassador to the Holy See and from the nuncio in Switzerland. Ambasciata di Polonia, February 2, 1943; Bernardini to Maglione, February 24 and 27, 1943, ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Germania, posiz. 742, ff. 72r–76v, 92r–98v.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 7
Generoso Pope’s telegram to Pius XII is dated March 5, 1943; Maglione’s reply was prepared March 7. ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Germania, posiz. 742, ff. 177r–80r. Generoso Pope, like much of the leadership of the Italian-American community, had earlier been a strong supporter of Mussolini. On the attitudes of Italian-Americans to Mussolini and Fascism, see Luconi 2000.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 8
Cicognani to Maglione, March 26, 1943, ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte 1, Germania, posiz. 742, f. 100r. In his reply of April 3, Maglione instructed Cicognani to inform the rabbis “that the Holy See continues to concern itself in favor of the Jews,” f. 102r.
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Mussolini had not named a replacement for Ciano as foreign minister in February, but instead retained for himself the Foreign Ministry, naming Bastianini his undersecretary.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 10
Tacchi Venturi to Maglione, April 14, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 152; Pirelli 1984, p. 430, diary entry for April 23, 1943. Italian military commanders rejected the Germans’ repeated deportation requests, placing the Jews in these areas instead into Italian-supervised concentration camps. Documents bearing on Vatican negotiations with Bastianini on the matter of the Nazi request can be found at ADSS, vol. 7, nn. 104, 105, 122, 127, 140, and 146. For Bastianini’s own account, see Bastianini 2005, p. 98. On the question of how Italian authorities dealt with the German requests to turn over Jews from Italian-controlled territory in France, see Fenoglio 2020.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 11
Rauscher 2004, p. 461; Bottai 1989, p. 374, diary entry for April 14, 1943; Pirelli 1984, p. 428, diary entry for April 22, 1943; Bastianini 2005, p. 128.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 12
Chapter 28: An Awkward Request
“Evolution de l’Italie en 1943,” May 5, 1943, MAEC, Papiers Chauvel, vol. 121, 197–98. A note for the Duce from the Italian embassy to the Vatican reported that Scorza’s remarks had pleased the prelates in the Secretariat of State, who were nervous about the new party secretary, associating him with earlier attacks on Catholic Action. Appunto per il Duce, May 7, 1943, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 164.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 1
Ambasciata italiana, Santa Sede, to Ministry of Popular Culture, May 13, 1943, tel. 1553, ASDMAE, APSS, b. 68. The story appeared in the May 9 issue of L’Avvenire di Roma.
On May 1, Rome’s major newspaper carried a story titled “May the Burning Heart of the Fatherland Foretell Victory.” The article consisted of the text of Cardinal Salotti’s recent message to Siena’s podestà. His words, praising Italy’s soldiers as “true authentic heroes, strenuously fighting up to the point of sacrificing their lives,” ended with the call for Axis victory that became the story’s title. Given the cardinal’s position in the Curia, heading the Sacred Congregation of Rites, his bellicose remarks occasioned both a complaint from Harold Tittmann, the American envoy, and an impassioned protest from the Brazilian ambassador to the Holy See. The documentation on this case is found at AAV, Segr. Stato, 1942, Cardinali, posiz. 51, ff. 23r–34r.
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“Incessante attività del Supremo Pastore per lenire le sofferenze della guerra e Sua invocazione per il ritorno della vera pace nel mondo,” OR, June 3, 1943, p. 1.
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Osborne to Foreign Office, June 3, 1943, NAK, FO 371, 37537, 37–39.
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Ciano, June 4, 1943, tel. 3751, ASDMAE, APSS, b. 64.
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Schlemmer 2009.
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Tittmann 2004, p. 146.
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Tardini notes, May 10, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 181, underlining in original.
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Pius XII to Mussolini, May 12, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 185.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 9
Maglione notes, May 12, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 186.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 10
Mussolini to Pius XII, May 12, 1943, ASDMAE, Gab., b. 1189.
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Ciano also shared some highly sensitive government secrets with the cardinal, telling him that the head of Italy’s military had termed the situation desperate. Another high-ranking general, Ciano added, had informed him that Palermo and Marsala, in western Sicily, had been largely destroyed, while Catania on the eastern coast of the island had suffered incalculable damage from the constant Allied bombardments. Allied planes, said Ciano, were now covering the skies like swarms of flies. Soon they would be covering the rest of Italy’s cities and, he pointed out, the country had no remaining air defenses. Maglione notes, May 13, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, nn. 189 and 190.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 12
Hassell 2011, p. xxii; Davis 2006, p. 117.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 13
Dalla Torre had recently sent a brief note to Cardinal Maglione. An influential group was planning to meet with the king to discuss how to extricate Italy from the war. It included three top military officers—the two marshals of the Italian army, First World War hero Enrico Caviglia and recently deposed supreme commander Pietro Badoglio, along with Admiral Thaon di Revel, Mussolini’s first naval minister—together with two of the country’s pre-Fascist prime ministers, including Ivanoe Bonomi. Should Victor Emmanuel decline to meet with them, Bonomi, the most influential non-Fascist political figure in the country, intended to let the king know it would leave them no alternative to exploring a future that would have no place for the monarchy. Dalla Torre to Maglione, May 12, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 188. A month later Dalla Torre provided a detailed follow-up report on the efforts under way to get the indecisive king to act. Dalla Torre to Maglione, June 11, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 244.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 14
Pirelli 1984, pp. 432–33, diary entry for May 12, 1943. Bonomi would meet with the king on June 2, asking that he remove Mussolini and appoint a provisional military government to end the alliance with Germany, to be followed by a civilian coalition government of anti-Fascists. The king replied that he did not want to empower the anti-Fascists. Boiardi et al. 1990, p. 12.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 15
Raccolta di prove documentali, May 12, 1943, ASR, Galla Placidia, CAP, Sezione istruttoria, b. 1669, f. 1010; De Felice 1996b, p. 1181.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 16
Cicognani, Washington, to Maglione, February 10, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 110.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 17
At the war’s end, in May 1945, Federzoni, one of the pillars of the Fascist regime, would receive a sentence of life in prison. Thanks to the help given him by Monsignor Montini, he was able to escape prison by taking refuge in the Ukrainian Pontifical College in Rome. Then in May 1946, with Vatican help, he succeeded in fleeing to Brazil. Mola 2019, p. xxii; Ciccozzi 2019, pp. lxxiv–lxxv.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 18
Maglione to Cicognani, Washington, D.C., May 22, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 208.
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Pius XII to President Roosevelt, May 19, 1943, FDR Library, psfa 495, pp. 73–75, reproduced in FRUS 1943, vol. 2, pp. 916–17.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 20
Algiers conference planning meeting minutes, May 29–June 3, 1943, FDR Library, mr 844, pp. 9–10.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 21
Cicognagni to Maglione, May 29, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 215.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 22
Tardini notes, May 31, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 219.
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Maglione to Cicognani, June 1, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 223.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 24
Tardini notes, June 1, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 221.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 25
Cicognani to Maglione, June 12, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 246.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 26
Borgongini to Maglione, June 17, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 252; Borgongini to Maglione, June 18, 1943, AAV, Arch. Nunz. Italia, b. 18, fasc. 4, ff. 124r–25r.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 27
Some chaplains, hearing of the plan, expressed their unease, and Cardinal Maglione called on Bartolomasi to come to see him. The result was a referral of the matter to the Vatican’s Consistorial Congregation, which called on the archbishop to “suspend” his request to the chaplains, concluding that having the chaplains play this role in the current climate would produce “the aversion of the population to the Clergy.” AAV, Segr. Stato, 1943, Diocesi, posiz. 179, ff. 1r–6v.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 28
Tardini notes, May 30, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 216.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 29
The note was sent to FDR via the nuncio in Washington. Cicognani to Myron Taylor, June 15, 1943, FRUS 1943, vol. 2, pp. 918–19.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 30
Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, Algiers, June 15, 1943, FDR Library, mr 303, p. 105. That same day, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Pius XII, copying Churchill. Italy had started the war, noted FDR. While Americans greatly valued Italy’s religious shrines and monuments, they were determined to win the war. He added, “In the event it should be found militarily necessary for Allied planes to operate over Rome our aviators are thoroughly informed as to the location of the Vatican and have been specifically instructed to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City.” FDR Library, psfa 495, pp. 69–71.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 31
The contrast between the British prime minister’s pugnacious stance and the solicitous attitude of the American president had long been clear to the pope, who would repeatedly turn to Roosevelt rather than to Churchill for support. The memo that the British government sent in late June to the Vatican secretary of state made this contrast apparent. “For immediate practical purposes it is not possible to discriminate between Italian Fascist leadership and policy on the one hand and the Italian people on the other, and Italy is inevitably identified with Mussolini and his policy.” In England, where people unhappy with the government were free to change it, the Foreign Office explained, “the blind submission of the Italian people to Mussolinian leadership is partly incomprehensible and, in so far as it is appreciated, a matter for mixed pity and contempt.” Not only had there been no sign from the Italian king or the Italian people that they disapproved of Mussolini’s policies, but there was good reason to suppose that had Mussolini been able to win the war in short order as he thought he would, “he would have been acclaimed by the Italian people as an astute statesman and a brilliant leader and benefactor of his country.” It was impossible to have any sympathy for the Italians; nor could any thought be given to allowing the country to bargain its way out of the war that it had so wantonly begun. Fascism had to be destroyed, and Italy had to surrender unconditionally. Légation de Grande Bretagne à la Secrétairerie d’État, Vatican City, June 28, 1943, ADSS, vol. 7, n. 271.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 32
Hull to FDR, June 29, 1943, FDR Library, psfa 495, pp. 83–86.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 33
Bishop Colli, director of Italian Catholic Action, the diplomat pointed out, had recently issued a similar appeal: “Now that the war is totalitarian, to subtract yourself from certain social duties means to be a deserter; it might also mean, in certain cases, to become a traitor.” D’Ajeta to Ministero degli Affari Esteri, June 12, 1943, n. 1882/717, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 164.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 34
Osborne to Foreign Office, and Montgomery to Foreign Office, June 13, 1943, NAK, FO 371, 37537, 61–66. The June 15 report from Berlin was sent on by the Italian Foreign Ministry to its embassy to the Holy See on June 18, tel. 19700, ASDMAE, APSS, b. 68. Mussolini’s Il Popolo d’Italia also devoted a long, respectful article to the pope’s speech. “Il discorso del Papa contro il bolscevismo,” June 15, 1943, p. 4. On the strikes in northern Italy, see Gooch 2020, p. 365.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 35
Maglione to Babuscio Rizzo, May 3, 1943; Babuscio Rizzo to Maglione, May 5, 1943, Babuscio Rizzo to Generale Cesare A.M.E., Capo del S.I.M., Roma, June 3, 1943, AAV, Carte Babuscio Rizzo, b. 1, fasc. 4, sottofasc. 8, ff. 2r–3r, 4r–5r, 6r–7r. “It is with great pleasure,” wrote Monsignor Luigi Micara, the nuncio, to Babuscio in an effusive letter of thanks in mid-June, “that I learned the news from my nephew of his new posting in your Ministry.” Mons. Luigi Micara to Babuscio Rizzo, June 12, 1943, AAV, Carte Babuscio Rizzo, b. 1, fasc. 4, sottofasc. 8, ff. 8r–9v.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 36
In mid-June, the French ambassador to the Holy See wrote to Vichy to warn that the men in the Vatican thought that the Allies would likely land not on Italian territory but on the Mediterranean coast of France, intending to make Provence their base for an assault on northern Italy. Bérard to Laval and Rochat, June 14, 1939, MAEC, Guerre Vichy, 544.
