The Pope at War, page 59
Tardini notes, May 10, 1940, with annex telegram of the French government to Charles-Roux, May 10, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 298; Osborne to Secretariat of State, May 10, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, nn. 298, 299, 300.
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Tardini notes, May 13, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 312.
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Ambassador Bullitt, Paris, to U.S. secretary of state, May 14, 1940, FRUS 1940, vol. 2, pp. 703–4.
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The Holy Father, insisted Cardinal Maglione, had already done all that was “just and opportune.” Maglione notes, May 14, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 316. “His Holiness is persuaded that Italy will enter the war within a month or shortly thereafter,” wrote Tardini in his diary on May 15. “His Holiness believes that the Germans will win, because they have both air and mechanical superiority.” Pagano 2020, p. 187.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 10
Alfieri 1955, pp. 13–14.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 11
Ciano 1980, pp. 421–22, diary entry for April 26, 1940; Goeschel 2018, p. 179.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 12
Before he met with the pope for his final audience as ambassador to the Holy See, Alfieri went to see Cardinal Maglione. Maglione took advantage of the occasion to complain about the violence suffered by the vendors and readers of the Vatican newspaper. Did this, asked the cardinal, reflect a government decision to end “the atmosphere of cordiality and mutual collaboration which had been happily restored” under the new pope? Alfieri insisted that the government had nothing to do with it, blaming the violence on “the impulsivity of a handful of youths in a moment of legitimate tension in public opinion.” Eager to see peace restored, the cardinal, as the ambassador reported to Ciano, “repeatedly, together with Mons. Montini, asked me to let Your Excellency know that the Vatican lacked any intention of in any way harming the national government…. He repeated to me, with great emotion, his deep attachment to Italy and the deep feeling with which he wished for the best fortunes for the common Fatherland.” Alfieri to Ciano, May 12, 1940, n. 1375/575, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 113.
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Montini notes, May 13, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 313. Following his meeting with the pontiff, Alfieri hastened to brief Mackensen on what the pope had said. He was especially eager to tell the German ambassador that, in response to the complaint about the pope’s three telegrams, Pius XII had replied that he had spent hours crafting his texts in such a way as to scrupulously avoid “any word of political import, such as ‘invasion,’ that might imply a viewpoint.” Whether he explicitly told the German ambassador of the pope’s eagerness to get a message to Hitler is less clear. Mackensen to Berlin, telegram, May 13, 1940, quoted in Friedländer 1966, pp. 49–50. As he was departing Rome, Alfieri handwrote a letter to the pope, thanking him for the benevolence the pope had shown him the previous day and vaunting the fact that in performing his duties both “as ambassador and as Catholic” he had helped bring about understanding between the government and the church. Alfieri concluded, “I leave with a more tranquil spirit, satisfied at having concluded my high mission [as ambassador to the Holy See] with one last intervention of mine, that of this morning, which shows again my position toward the Church and my profound, immutable devotion to Your Holiness.” Alfieri to Pius XII, May 14, 1940, AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Stato Città Vaticano, posiz. 63, ff. 69r–70v.
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Eager to maintain good relations with Italy’s new ambassador to Germany, the pope instructed Montini to go to the train station to see him off, but mistakenly thinking that the train was to depart at midnight, the monsignor arrived after it had left. Montini to Alfieri, May 15, 1940, ACS, Archivi di Personalità della Politica e della Pubblica Amministrazione, Alfieri, b. 10, Vaticano.
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Di Rienzo 2018, p. 310; Alfieri to Ciano, May 23, 1940, DDI, series 9, vol. 4, n. 553. Göring, meeting with Alfieri after the bestowal of the Italian honor, was eager to ply him for news of the pope and to talk about Germany’s relations with the Catholic Church. Göring compared Germany’s clergy unfavorably to Italy’s. In Italy the great majority of the clergy supported the government and supported Fascism, he said, while in Germany there were cases of high prelates who stood decisively against Nazism. Alfieri to Ciano, May 23, 1940, DDI, series 9, vol. 4, n. 553.
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“I must add,” observed the nuncio in Paris, in reporting the meeting to Cardinal Maglione, “that this idea of excommunication had not germinated by itself in Mr. Bullitt’s mind.” Indeed, only the previous evening a French senator, speaking on behalf of members of France’s Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, had come to see the nuncio to ask whether the moment had not come for the pope to excommunicate Hitler, before then raising the same question about Mussolini.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 17
Mons. Valeri to Maglione, May 15, 1940; Maglione to Valeri, May 17, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, nn. 317 and 324. Pleas to the pope to speak out more clearly were coming from within the church as well. The same day as the nuncio wrote, the archbishop of Paris sent an anguished letter to the pope, begging him to do more to prevent Mussolini from joining Hitler in the assault on France. Some indication of the sense of urgency felt at the time is evident from the fact that the French ambassador delivered Cardinal Suhard’s letter to the Apostolic Palace at eleven-fifteen p.m. the night of May 17. AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Diocesi, posiz. 123, f. 8r. The pope replied that he had already done all he could to keep Italy out of the conflict. Archbishop Suhard, Paris, to Pius XII, May 15, 1940; Maglione to Suhard, May 25, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, nn. 319 and 329. Related documentation on Cardinal Suhard’s plea and the pope’s response can be found at AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Diocesi, posiz. 123, ff. 1r–13r.
The Duce’s success in intimidating the pope by unleashing attacks on the Vatican newspaper was clear to the French ambassador at the Vatican as well. Writing to Paris on May 16, Charles-Roux described Montini as “suffering visibly from the blow inflicted by a campaign of intimidation aimed against the Holy See by the Fascist Party and probably inspired by the numerous German agents who are found in Rome. The people in the Vatican, impressionable and easily intimidated by physical brutality, seem to me to yield in this moment to an exaggerated fear.” Charles-Roux to French Foreign Ministry, May 16, 1940, MAEC, Papiers Duparc.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 18
Stefano Vitti to Pius XII, May 14, 1940, AAV, Segr. Stato, anno 1940, Stato Città Vaticano, b. 63, f. 111r.
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Una Italiana Civile e Cristiana to Pius XII, n.d., AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Stato Città Vaticano, posiz. 63, ff. 139r–40r.
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Le donne Cattoliche d’Italia to Pius XII, n.d., AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Stato Città Vaticano, posiz. 63, f. 120r.
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Alfieri to Ciano, May 23, 1940, DDI, series 9, vol. 4, n. 553.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 22
Foreign Office, London, to Osborne, May 18, 1940, R5999/55/22, NAK, FO 371, 24935, 92; Dixon handwritten note, June 3, 1942, NAK, FO 371, 33411, 152; Informativa da Roma (n. 535—Mezzabotta), May 20, 1940, ACS, MI, MAT, b. 217.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 23
Cardinal Hlond to Montini, May 13, 1940; and Montini to Hlond, May 20, 1940, AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Stati e Corpo Diplomatico, posiz. 275, ff. 29r, 26r.
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Chapter 14: An Honorable Death
Buffarini, undersecretary of internal affairs, meeting with the nuncio, surprised him by remarking that the Holy See, in publishing the pope’s three telegrams, had acted “against all of Europe.” What, the nuncio asked, did he mean by “all of Europe”? “But don’t you know,” replied Buffarini, “that we and the Germans have divided up Europe?” Italy, he added, would enter the war within two weeks but would not be at war long, for it would all be over soon. Borgongini to Maglione, May 23, 1940, reporting on meeting the previous day, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 328.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 1
Visani (2007, pp. 133, 144) provides the excerpts from the May 22 Ministry of Popular Culture, Gabinetto report and the May 24 report of the informant in Genoa.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 2
Hitler to Mussolini, May 25, 1940; Mackensen to Ribbentrop, May 26, 1940, DGFP, series D, vol. 9, nn. 317, 320; Goeschel 2018, p. 182.
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On the role played by Pirelli and the other major Italian industrialists as the Fascist regime hurtled toward disaster, see Carace 2021.
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Borgongini to Maglione, May 28, 1940, ADSS, vol. 1, n. 332; Pirelli 1984, pp. 262–63, diary entry for May 28, 1940. Mackensen’s report to Berlin the next day similarly described Ciano as eager to see Italy enter the war and complaining that it was the Italian military command that kept delaying it. “If one went by the military men,” Ciano told the German ambassador, “one would never be ready.” Mackensen to Foreign Ministry, Berlin, May 29, 1940, DGFP, series D, vol. 9, n. 343.
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Petersen 1994, pp. 107, 112–13; Ciano 1980, pp. 421–22, diary entry for April 27, 1940. Eleonora, who was as good-looking and glamorous as her husband was plain and reserved, was perceptive and talented in her own right. Although Attolico had spent five years in Berlin, he never learned to speak German, and when Hitler, who knew only that language, stopped to chat with her husband at receptions, Eleonora stood at his side, translating. Tall, slender, and self-confident, she was not however particularly appreciated by the pope. Following protocol at the Vatican for the presentation of a new ambassador’s credentials, Attolico had brought Eleonora with him to meet the pope. Later, Pius XII complained that she had kept talking the whole time. Mackensen to Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 30, 1940, DGFP, series D, vol. 9, n. 181; Informativa da Roma (n. 352—Montuschi), May 2, 1940, ACS, MI, MAT, b. 217; Mackensen to Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 30, 1940, DGFP, series D, vol. 9, n. 181; d’Ormesson to Vichy, July 21, 1940, MAEC, Guerre Vichy, 559.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 6
Attolico to Ciano, May 21, 1940, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 113. The Montini quote is from Babuscio Rizzo’s report of his conversation with him on May 21. Appunto per l’Eccellenza l’Ambasciatore, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 113. Montini’s May 18 conversation with Attolico is reported in a note dated the next day, at AAV, Segr. Stato, 1940, Stato Città Vaticano, posiz. 63, ff. 56rv.
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The result was soon evident to all, as the British envoy in the Vatican reported to London. While in the past the newspaper had offered the only objective account of world events to be found in Italy, “its columns are now almost entirely devoted to information of a religious nature, and it no longer makes any attempt at enlightenment or comment on world affairs. It has died an honourable death, or has at any rate honourably succumbed to temporary extinction, as an organ of information and interpretation.” Osborne to Halifax, May 21, 1940, NAK, FO 371, 24935, 84–85; Attolico to Ciano, May 22, 1940, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 113. The May 25 OR article is quoted in Pighin 2010, pp. 43–44.
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Indeed, reported the ambassador, Pius XII said that he “would be pleased to be notified of any desire we may have, in such a way to be able—to the extent possible—to satisfy us.” Now that the conflict over L’Osservatore Romano had been put behind them, Attolico asked the pope at their late May meeting if he had any other matters particularly dear to him. Yes, replied the pontiff, he did, for he was concerned about how the Italian government would treat foreign diplomats to the Holy See in case Italy entered the war. Those representing countries Italy regarded as enemies, said the pope, should be allowed to remain unmolested in Rome.
The Vatican had raised the question before, and Attolico had a response ready. While the Lateran Accords did guarantee the Holy See the right to freely engage in diplomatic relations with other countries, international law did not require a nation at war to allow diplomats from enemy nations to remain on its soil.
Perhaps that was true, replied the pope, but the government should consider the consequences of taking such a stance. “If these diplomats take refuge in the Vatican, something I am unable to prevent, they will be less easily under surveillance by the Royal Authorities.” It was an argument that would have little sway with the Duce, who had no lack of spies in the Vatican. Attolico to Ciano, May 30, 1939 (reporting on papal audience of May 29), n. 1565/692, ASDMAE, AISS, b. 152.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 9
Mackensen to Foreign Ministry, May 30, 1940, and Mussolini to Hitler, May 30, 1940, DGFP, series D, vol. 9, nn. 350, 356; Ciano 1980, p. 436, diary entry for May 30, 1940; Phillips to FDR, May 31, 1940, FDR Library, pfsa 401, pp. 73–75. As the ambassador put it in a letter to Welles the same day, “Mussolini is evidently bewitched by the accomplishments of Germany by brute force and sees an easy and cheap victory ahead for himself and a means to his own aggrandizement.” Phillips to Welles, FDR Library, psfa 401, pp. 82–83.
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Phillips told President Roosevelt that Mussolini “undoubtedly has the Caesar complex of adding to the Empire by hook or crook.” The ambassador thought Mussolini’s eagerness to go to war was all the more remarkable because Germany had shown no need for Italy’s assistance. Phillips to FDR, May 31, 1940, FDR Library, psfa 401, pp. 73–77; Milza 2000, pp. 834–35.
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Chapter 15: A Short War
Ciano to all foreign diplomats, June 10, 1940, DDI, series 9, vol. 4, n. 842; Grandi 1985, p. 586; François-Poncet 1961, pp. 178–79; Bottai 1989, p. 193, diary entry for June 10, 1940.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 1
De Felice 1981, pp. 841–42.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 2
Petacci 2011, p. 327, diary entry for June 10, 1940; Grandi 1985, pp. 588–89.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 3
Roberts 2018, p. 553. On June 10 the French foreign minister notified the papal nuncio in Paris that the French government was vacating the city that day. The German army would enter the French capital four days later. A few days after that, the nuncio sent a letter to the Vatican: “God be thanked, all is now passed in Paris and I am well. The occupation of the city took place amid the greatest calm and correctly. The authorities have given me as well every assurance. The Cardinal Archbishop [of Paris] has remained here, with the entire Curia and virtually all the clergy.” French foreign minister to Valeri, Paris, June 10, 1940, and Valeri to Maglione, June 20, 1940 (sent via the nuncio in Berlin), AAV, Nunz. Parigi, Nunziatura Valeri, b. 574, fasc. 368, ff. 1r, 12r.
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A few hours before Mussolini’s declaration of war, the military attaché at the American embassy in Rome had sent Washington a critique of Mussolini’s motives: “Due to the unprepared position of Italy to sustain a long war it would appear that if Italy does enter the war now the Duce is convinced that the war will be over within several months…. If his estimate is not correct and the war continues for a long period of time, it is believed that Italy cannot sustain herself and will be ruined.” Col. G. H. Paine, Rome, June 10, 1940, NARA, RG 165, 2062-716, 3, color 125.
BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 5
Friedländer 1966, p. 54; Paxton 1972, pp. 13–14. Although the pope never made any move to replace Orsenigo, there is some evidence that he himself was concerned that his nuncio in Berlin was overly worried about doing anything that might offend Hitler. A telegram from Cardinal Maglione to Orsenigo on April 13, 1940, had a clearly admonitory tone: “It is the wish of the Holy Father that Your Most Reverend Excellency transmit all the reports that the Bishops desire to send him, as is their right and duty, and that Your Excellency neither obstruct nor discourage these Bishops, who judge it the duty of their pastoral ministry to present in such a manner complaints and protests against the violations of the rights and the freedoms of the Church. The Holy Father trusts that this Nunciature will carry out this, his order exactly.” ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Pio XII, parte Extracta, Germania, posiz. 600, f. 5r. That same file contains a 1956 note by Monsignor Tardini on Orsenigo’s attitude toward Nazism, which he termed overly “passive.” Tardini claimed that Orsenigo “always remained doubtful and suspicious toward the Most Eminent Cardinal Pacelli” (ff. 89v–90r).
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Maglione, meeting with the new French ambassador on the morning of June 11, recounted this story prior to asking him to plead with his government to have the Allies spare Rome from bombardment, now that Italy had declared war. D’Ormesson to French Foreign Ministry, June 11, 1940, MAEC, Guerre Vichy, 461.
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D’Ormesson to Foreign Ministry, Paris, June 2, 1940, MAEC, Papiers Duparc. The fact that the pope’s speech “contained no word of warning against Italian entry into the war,” observed the British envoy to the Vatican, “is an evident sign that he regards the decision as irrevocable.” Osborne to Halifax, June 4, 1940, NAK, FO 380/48, n. 86.
