Enemy on the Euphrates, page 32
Meanwhile, in Baghdad, GHQ in the person of Brigadier General i/c Administration P.O. Hambro, recently arrived from the Persian hill station, had taken upon himself the task of arranging the transportation by rail of men and supplies to the ‘Rumaytha Front’. This was much to the annoyance of Major General Leslie, who was preparing to leave for Diwaniyya and who considered that it was he who should have been making the necessary arrangements. Leslie’s irritation rapidly turned to fury when he arrived at the railway station in the late afternoon of 17 July, as he later recorded.
The train to take me and the 10th Gurkhas – recently arrived by forced march from the Upper Euphrates – to Diwaniyya was to leave at 6.30 p.m. When I arrived at the station I found that GHQ [i.e. Hambro] had loaded the whole train with ‘comforts for troops’ and the 10th Gurkhas could not get on it, nor were there any other rolling stock in the station! I must confess that my temper was really put to the test now. But I might have expected something of the sort from a Staff which turned up to do its job at the last moment and insisted upon relieving me of that job though my staff were perfectly capable of doing it in addition to their own work.19
However, Leslie was not the man to be overawed by a GHQ staff officer and he immediately ordered the unloading of the 6.30 p.m. train and the embarkation of the Gurkhas. So by 4.20 p.m. the next day Leslie and the Gurkhas arrived at Diwaniyya and the Gurkhas began yet another forced march to try to catch up with the relief column.
By now it had become obvious to the War Office that recent events in Iraq would have to be fully reported to the cabinet and – in due course – to Parliament. Consequently, on 17 July Churchill informed his government colleagues that ‘the situation in Mesopotamia has come to a head.’20
Having presented a summary of military events in Iraq since 1 July – an account which did not minimise the difficulties the British were facing – Churchill explained that General Haldane had used his last reserves and that it was essential that a further reserve should be formed. In response to Haldane’s request for reinforcements made two days earlier, the general staff had already moved swiftly to commit a full division from India in spite of the fact that Haldane himself had only suggested that it was ‘probable’ that a full division would be needed. The financial implication of these developments was clear and the secretary of state for war did not hesitate to spell it out: the reinforcements would cost ‘millions … all prospect of reduction is at an end. A very large supplementary estimate is inevitable.’ All other objectives must now be subordinated to one single aim. ‘Whatever the future policy may be, the rising … should be stamped out with the utmost vigour.’21
However, it would be at least two weeks before any troops from India would begin to arrive in Iraq and a further four to five weeks before the full division completed its disembarkation at Basra. In the meantime it was essential that forces already in the region were redeployed so that the maximum pressure could be brought to bear on the Euphrates rebels. But from which combat zone should these reinforcements be withdrawn?
The situation on the Upper Euphrates and Syrian border had quietened down over the last few months, largely because Haldane had deployed most of his reserves in that theatre. However, news from London suggested it was now inevitable that the French would attack Damascus and crush Syria’s nascent Arab government. Churchill thought that if that happened, Emir Faysal might join the Turks, foment trouble for Britain in Iraq and Palestine or even call for a jihad against all Europeans. In other words, withdrawing any more troops from the Syrian border areas would be extremely risky. To the north, Turkish nationalists continued to threaten the British position at Zakho and could even pose a threat to Mosul; it was also possible that Turkish troops would combine forces with the Kurds. It would be extremely unwise to withdraw troops from this frontier, given the continuing failure of the European powers and their postwar puppet government in Istanbul to subdue Mustapha Kemal and his men. Finally, on the eastern flank, Persia continued to be threatened by a combination of Bolshevik troops and local nationalist rebels. Haldane had the equivalent of two brigades in that enfeebled state, propping up a friendly government – should Britain abandon an ally and allow Persia to decline into chaos? The strategic choices were exceptionally difficult; as Churchill himself put it, ‘We find, therefore, that we are threatened with possible trouble from the west, the north and east. All the alternatives are disagreeable.’
However, the war secretary was not one to evade the making of difficult choices. ‘Persia’, he advised the cabinet, ‘remains the safest place from which troops can be withdrawn and it is considered that on military grounds the General Officer Commanding should be authorized to withdraw Noperforce.’ But would the cabinet agree?
While Churchill and his colleagues were considering these broad strategic issues, General Coningham was approaching the location where the first attempt to relieve Rumaytha had failed. By now the insurgents’ position on the banks of the Hilla branch of the Euphrates, where the river curves round in a great loop, had been further strengthened, and now consisted of a series of trenches hidden by scrub in front of parallel lines of dried-up canal beds impassable to wheeled vehicles and lying directly across the column’s line of march. The position was a particularly strong one, given that the rebels on the left bank of the Hilla channel could enfilade the British troops as they moved forward to attack the insurgents’ main defences on the right bank. Moreover, the insurgent forces had increased to around 5,000 men spread out along a front of 3,500 yards.
By now so many men of the Royal Irish Rifles had gone down with heatstroke that the unit was effectively out of action. Nevertheless, at 1.10 p.m. on 19 July, Coningham’s six 18-pounder guns opened up and after the initial bombardment the two battalions leading the relief column, the 45th Sikhs and the 116th Mahrattas, were sent forward against the insurgents’ position. But the rebels, instructed by former Ottoman army officers and NCOs, had prepared their position extremely well and the sepoys failed to break through.
However, an hour later the 10th Gurkhas arrived, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Scott, having marched towards the sound of Coningham’s guns.22 Coningham and Scott now scanned the battleground with their binoculars, searching for a point in the enemy’s defences which could be outflanked. Villages were visible along the line of the river, but from the British position and the flatness of the terrain it was not possible to determine which river bank they were on. Eventually, two objectives were chosen – Umm Nijiris, a small village surrounded by palm trees, and another group of mud-brick buildings a mile further upstream.
So, after a short rest, at 5.00 p.m. ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies of the Gurkhas were thrown into an attack on these two points. There followed a bitter struggle to try to occupy both sides of the river. ‘A’ Company, under its commander Captain Selby Moore, made for Umm Nijiris while ‘C’ Company provided covering fire supported by a section of British machine-gunners. But after only a few bursts of machine-gun fire, the British gunners collapsed, half-dead with heatstroke. However, although deprived of effective covering fire, ‘A’ Company advanced grimly towards the river under heavy enemy fire and managed to establish themselves on the near bank.
At this point the river was only forty yards wide but fast-flowing and in places as much as ten feet deep. Nevertheless Captain Moore, with the company jemadar, Panchalal Limbu, led several desperate attempts to cross the river under heavy fire from the insurgents’ positions. None succeeded and during one of these gallant efforts both men were killed. So as darkness fell, Coningham was forced to withdraw both companies of Gurkhas to a position 500 yards from the river.
Once again, it appeared that it might be impossible to relieve Rumaytha. The column’s advance was blocked. Worse still, as the British attacks petered out, the Arabs began to go on the offensive, mounting sporadic attacks on the 45th Sikhs holding the British forward positions. The situation of the second relief column was now as precarious as that of its predecessor. There was no possibility of further reinforcements yet Coningham remained, facing a strong and resolute enemy in possession of an equally strong defensive position. His men and horses were running short of water and he had insufficient ammunition for a full second day’s fighting. There were also a substantial number of sick and wounded with only very basic medical supplies available. He had little choice except to order one more attack.
At dawn the next day, the 10th Gurkhas were again thrown against the right flank of the enemy’s position. Two platoons of Gurkhas from ‘C’ Company, the water reaching up to their armpits – but this time, supported by covering fire from artillery, Lewis and Hotchkiss guns – managed to cross to the left bank of the river on a front of 500 yards. Taken in the flank, the insurgents fell back and the Gurkhas began to advance down the left bank of the Hilla, rolling up the enemy’s position. Coningham now ordered the 45th Sikhs to mount another frontal attack on the rebel position on the right bank, but as they advanced they found the enemy trenches abandoned. The rebels had slipped away – either to avoid being outflanked or because of a shortage of ammunition. So by 6.45 a.m. on 20 July Coningham had three battalions of infantry occupying the insurgents’ former position, and two hours later a train from Diwaniyya arrived, bringing water, ammunition and medical dressings which Coningham had ordered to be loaded during the night.
Leaving the 116th Mahrattas to guard the train and transport vehicles, Coningham moved forward without opposition. By 3.45 p.m. word came through that his advance guard of cavalry had entered Rumaytha thirty-five minutes earlier. Rumaytha had been relieved, but at the cost of three British officers and thirty-two Indian other ranks killed and two British officers and 150 Indian other ranks wounded. In addition, since Rumaytha had been first besieged, the garrison had suffered 148 casualties killed, wounded or missing.23
Even then, the tribulations of the garrison and relief force were not over. Leslie knew it was folly to continue to leave small numbers of men defending each and every town in insurgent territory and he therefore ordered Coningham to retire with all his men and guns to Diwaniyya. So on the morning of 22 July the column set off northwards. It was not long before bands of Arab horsemen began to appear at the rear and on the flanks of the column. Then, at 7.00 a.m., under cover of a dust storm, a large party of tribesmen fell upon the 87th Punjabis who were acting as rearguard.24 The 45th Sikhs were ordered to turn about and support the 87th, but as they did so they became hopelessly intermingled with the cavalry who were also trying to come to the aid of the infantry. RUMCOL was now in great danger, especially since its commander could see nothing but dust, and during a chaotic few minutes the 87th Punjabis suffered sixty-nine casualties including two of their British officers.25 Fortunately, three companies of the Royal Irish Rifles managed to make their way to the rear of the column and eventually succeeded in driving off the insurgents and re-forming the rearguard.
Thereafter, the rebels contented themselves with occasional sniping, with their horsemen ranging round the column but never closing in. At 5.00 p.m. the column was able to halt and make a protected camp alongside the river bank. The column’s exploits on 22 July had rivalled its earlier achievements. Having started out at 3.00 a.m. they had marched and fought through the fierce heat of the day, made worse by a dust storm which had raged for several hours. By the time they made camp, both British and Indian officers and men were very nearly at the end of their endurance. Fortunately, after this, Coningham was able to continue his withdrawal to Diwaniyya in relative safety, arriving there on 25 July.
However, the general military situation remained far from satisfactory. The insurgents had been left in control of Rumaytha, the uprising had spread to neighbouring tribes and word was spreading rapidly throughout all the tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates that the Ingliz had been defeated, that they were too weak to withstand the rebel forces and that they were clearly in the process of relinquishing control over the country.
THE SCENE OF THE MANCHESTER COLUMN DISASTER JULY 1920: THE CAMP ON THE RUSTUMIYYA CANAL
26
The Destruction of the Manchester Column
While General Haldane’s attention was focused on the besieged garrison at Rumaytha, the insurgency continued to spread, gathering in more and more tribesmen, their sheikhs swept up in a great swell of religious fervour and primitive patriotism which gave them little room to manoeuvre, even when their sheikhly interests might have been better served by remaining obedient to the British. By mid-July 1920 around 35,000 Arab tribesmen were in arms and the number of British garrisons and outposts at risk of being cut off and destroyed was increasing.1
In particular, fears grew for the safety of the British outpost at Kufa, where a small detachment of Indian troops from the 108th Infantry Regiment was keeping a wary eye on the rebellious city of Najaf seven and a half miles to the south-west. Kufa, a town of around 3,500 inhabitants, situated on the right bank of the channel of the same name, lay thirty-three miles south of the British base at Hilla. For twenty-one miles of that distance a narrow-gauge railway, built during the war, ran as far as Kifl, another small British outpost and railway terminus and the point where the Hindiyya branch of the great Euphrates divides, forming two further channels, the Kufa and the Shamiyya. As early as 11 July, the stationmaster at Kifl had reported that attacks on the railway station and telegraph lines were anticipated and the railway staff were authorised to withdraw north to Hilla. However, the following day, the PO for the Hilla Division, Major Pulley, considered it safe enough for the railway staff to return.
Meanwhile, Major P. Fitzgerald Norbury, the PO for the Shamiyya Division, accompanied by his youthful APO, Captain Mann, began a series of visits to the sheikhs of the Khaza’il, Bani Hasan and Shibl tribes, attempting to bribe them to abandon the al-Fatla, who were currently the most actively engaged insurgents. But this was to no avail and on 13 July the al-Fatla and their allies began to threaten Kufa.
The defenders of Kufa totalled 730 men, 486 of whom were Indian troops of the 108th Infantry plus their four British officers.2 The only other fighting men were a motley force of 115 Arab and Persian levies commanded by six British officers and three British NCOs. There were also 102 Indians and fourteen British employed by the Civil Administration. However, Norbury had selected a strong defensive position of stone buildings on the edge of the town and adjacent to the river and ensured that this strongpoint was well stocked with supplies and ammunition. Moreover the gunboat HMS Firefly had just arrived at Abu Sukhair, a few miles south of Kufa, having steamed down from the Upper Euphrates, and could easily return to Kufa in a few hours.
Signs of hostility began to show themselves on 14 July when insurgents opened fire on a British launch carrying supplies which would have certainly been captured without the intervention of Firefly, after which the gunboat was ordered upriver to Kufa. Then, on 20 July, the British base in the town came under sporadic rifle fire.
By the following day the British outpost was completely encircled and the attacks grew fiercer. Soon a number of buildings near to the British defensive perimeter were set on fire and Norbury and Mann repeatedly led fire-fighting parties to try to extinguish the flames. On 22 July, in the course of another of these sorties, Captain Mann was shot and killed by the Arab attackers.3 Wilson had lost yet another of his ‘young men’. Meanwhile, insurgent raiding parties began to threaten Kifl and on 23 July its railway station was overrun by a section of the Bani Hasan tribe, and the railway staff, who had been ordered back to their posts on 12 July, were captured and taken prisoner to Najaf.
As the military situation in the Shamiyya Division deteriorated, on Thursday 22 July Major General Leslie, still at Diwaniyya, was summoned to Baghdad for a conference with the GOC-in-chief and the following day was flown up to Baghdad for the meeting with Haldane. Afterwards he paid a visit to his own 17th Division HQ and it was there, later that Friday morning, that he received a telegram from Colonel R.C.W. Lukin, commanding officer at Hilla, who had replaced the ‘hysterical’ General Wauchope a few days earlier. With Kifl overrun by rebel tribesmen and the Hilla–Kifl railway cut in a number of places, Colonel Lukin informed Leslie that he was under intense pressure from the local PO, Major Pulley, to send out a detachment towards Kifl, in order to ‘show the flag’ in the hope that this would deter the ‘wavering’ northern sections of the Bani Hasan from joining the insurgency.4 The telegram requested authorisation to do so.
The only troops at Hilla available for this purpose were the 2nd Battalion of the Manchester Regiment (less one company), a field artillery battery, a field ambulance section, a company of Indian pioneers and two squadrons of Indian cavalry, in total around 800 men, all units from the 18th Division which had been sent to Hilla, on GHQ’s order, to form a column there for the purpose of retaking Kifl and relieving Kufa – but only when a sufficiently strong force had been assembled.
Colonel Lukin’s telegram informed Leslie that he intended to send a column made up of the units currently available down the road to Kifl to a point six miles south of Hilla called Imam Bakr, which had been reconnoitred and was reported as having a good supply of water for both animals and men.5 The objective was to ‘show the flag’ as requested by the PO. Lukin asked Leslie to approve this move and to authorise a continuation of the advance towards Kifl if circumstances allowed.6
