Enemy on the Euphrates, page 21
At the close of the meeting at Abu al-Timman’s home it was decided that Ja‘far himself should be sent to Karbela’ to observe and evaluate the extent of the tribal mobilisation in the surrounding region and establish a permanent link between the Baghdad nationalists and the Shi‘i holy places.35
So on 4 May 1920, in the golden-domed city of Karbela’, Abu al-Timman was ushered into a secret congregation of sheikhs and sada in the presence of the Grand Mujtahid Mirza Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi and his son Mirza Muhammad Ridha.36 The meeting was held in the Dar al-Hujja (House of Religious Debate) in Karbela’. Shirazi, a diminutive figure in a large white turban, was seated on a low couch supported by pillows and by his side sat Mirza Muhammad Ridha, himself already grey-bearded, wearing a smaller white turban. By now Ridha was the intellectual driving force behind the independence movement in the mid-Euphrates. He was president of al-Jam‘iyya al-‘Iraqiyya al-‘Arabiyya which advocated collaboration with both the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks and he believed that some, at least, of the political principles of the latter were compatible with the values of Shi‘i Islam.37 In fact, he had already been accused by the British of openly disseminating the contents of an Arabic book entitled Mabadi’ al-Balshafiyya (The Principles of Bolshevism). According to British police reports, Ridha was actually ‘in touch with the Bolsheviks, who, in an open telegram, proclaimed him to be the head of the movement of liberation from the British’, and he was ‘mentioned by name in a wireless message issued by the Bolsheviks at Resht [in Persia] as working for the Bolshevik cause at Karbela’.38
Along each side of the Dar al-Hujja sat the invited mujtahidin, sheikhs and sada, carefully seated on their own low couches with their feet tucked under them; among them ‘Abd al-Wahid Sikar, sheikh of the al-Fatla tribe, a thin-faced man with high cheekbones, moustached but beardless, wearing a black cloak and the white kufiyya with black mesh patterning typical of the Shi‘is; present also was Sha’lan Abu al-Jun, sheikh of the Dhawalim section of the Bani Huchaym, an older, burly man, black bearded but similarly attired. The contingent of green-turbaned tribal sada, their black cloaks draped over their shoulders in the customary manner, included Sayyid Hadi al-Zwayn, one of the two emissaries to Baghdad, and Sayyid Nur al-Sayyid ‘Aziz, both men of high status in a society which accepted and greatly valued their claim of descent from the line of Husayn and the Prophet.39
One after the other, the assembled notables expressed their anger at the arrogant and brutal behaviour of the British in the mid-Euphrates region, their belief that the occupiers were nevertheless weakening and withdrawing their forces, the news (some accurate, some exaggerated) of British setbacks in Persia and elsewhere, and the readiness of their men to take up arms if and when the clergy of the holy cities authorised them to do so; the discussion went on well into the night.
At last Taqi al-Shirazi, the Grand Mujtahid, spoke. A judgement on this question was, he said, ‘a heavy burden’.40 He was worried that, for all their courage, the tribes would be unable to stand up to the British and Indian forces with their aeroplanes and bombs. Shirazi was also troubled by the morality of authorising a campaign of violence when peaceful methods of opposition to British rule had not been exhausted. Indeed, at first he insisted that ‘keeping the peace is more important than the revolution’. Yet he strongly sympathised with the anger and frustration of the delegates and eventually gave his support to an intensification of the campaign to oust the British. ‘If this is your intention and this is your pledge then God will help you,’ Shirazi finally declared – provided the rebels’ actions were consistent with the maintenance of ‘order and peace’. Precisely how this was to be achieved was not, however, resolved.
Nevertheless, as far as Ja‘far Abu al-Timman was concerned, the conference in Karbela’ had been a revelation. It had opened his eyes to the intensity of anti-British feeling in the heavily populated mid-Euphrates region and the realisation that the political movement in Baghdad now had a powerful constituency outside the capital, moreover one which was armed and ready to move against the British should that eventually become necessary. This was the essence of his report to Haras al-Istiqlal when he returned to Baghdad on 9 May.
The following day the executive committee of the organisation decided to launch a political campaign for independence in Baghdad which would unite both the Sunni and Shi‘i communities.41 The season was approaching when it was customary for the Sunnis to hold a series of celebrations known as mauluds in honour of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth; however, on this occasion leading members of the Shi‘i community would also be invited to take part. The objective was to hold these joint Sunni–Shi‘i mauluds at all the 130 mosques of Baghdad, where the religious festivities would be followed by orations and recitals of poetry in which patriotic and religious themes would be woven together in a rising crescendo of demands for istiqlal – independence. As one sheikh who would later play an active role in the armed uprising succinctly put it, the demand for independence would be concealed ‘behind a veil of religion’ because, although the British authorities had banned political meetings and rallies, it was believed that they would be reluctant to intervene in what were, ostensibly, religious gatherings.42
Letters were therefore sent out to all the Muslim notables of the city inviting them to the first of these joint mauluds to be held at one of the city’s great Sunni mosques, the Haydar Khana. After supper at six o’clock on the evening of 19 May 1920, the Sunni Mulla Uthman initiated the maulud.43 This was followed by a recitation of the Shi‘i Ta’ziyya – the devotional rendering of the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn – by a Shi‘i notable, Muhammad Mahdi al Basir from Hilla.44 The congregation was also addressed by one of the principal leaders of Haras al-Istiqlal, ‘Ali al-Bazirgan. After this remarkable demonstration of solidarity between the two Muslim sects, participants began to stand up and make political speeches and recitations favouring independence and an end to the mandate.
In fact the Shi‘is and Sunnis of Baghdad had already begun to draw together the previous year. According to Bell, in her report to Parliament in November 1920,
For some time past it had been obvious to the nationalists that it would be necessary for them to present a united Islamic front. The deep prejudices which separate the Sunni and the Shi‘i sects were temporarily overcome. The first symptom of a rapprochement occurred in the summer of 1919 when on two occasions Sunnis attended the religious meetings which were held in memory of the deceased Shi‘i mujtahid Sayyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. But it was not until the following month of Ramadan which began on 19 May 1920 that the political significance of the reconciliation became apparent.45
It wasn’t long before Wilson’s administration realised that a new and potentially highly threatening development was taking place. On 29 May the judicial secretary, Bonham Carter, wrote to Wilson, warning him that ‘the drawing together of the Shias and Sunnis, nominally as a religious movement but in reality on political grounds to oppose us shows strong prospects of becoming an accomplished fact.’46
Some of the British military based in Baghdad also began to note a general change in the political atmosphere in the city. On 25 May Major General G.A.J. Leslie, commander of the 17th Division, wrote to his wife Edith in India, saying how glad he was that he had sent her and their daughter Kathleen there a fortnight earlier, adding that there had recently been attacks on individual British personnel. ‘I am carrying a loaded revolver,’ he informed her.47
Three days later, he wrote to her again describing the ‘clear efforts … being made to bring an entente between the Sunnis and the Shias’. He related how, on 24 May, the authorities had been forced to intervene. A young man named ‘Isa Abd al-Qadir had been arrested after delivering a nationalist poem at the Jalani Mosque which Wilson considered to be ‘dangerous to public order’.48 The following day the young man was bundled off to imprisonment at Basra.49 However, General Leslie had his own particular slant on this event. At this ‘seditious meeting’ the arrested man had not only made a speech which called upon Sunnis and Shi‘is to unite but he had also ‘mentioned a white woman at Clock Tower Barracks in a suggestive way’. True or not, nothing was more likely to enrage a British officer than a report that one of the ‘natives’ was casting aspersions upon the virtue of a ‘memsahib’.50
Wilson was under the impression that the arrest of al-Qadir – a relatively restrained response to the campaign of opposition – would be sufficient to cool the ardour of a movement whose significance he was inclined to belittle and sending the prisoner to Basra would also remove a focus for demonstrations. But the leaders of the independence movement saw the action differently – an act of repression: but one so half-hearted that it indicated weakness rather than strength.
So, on the evening of al-Qadir’s arrest, the leaders of Haras al-Istiqlal met once again at the house of Abu al-Timman to plan an intensification of the campaign: a protest demonstration the following day and the election of a team of delegates who would confront the civil commissioner with a madhbata – a mass petition demanding among other things the immediate formation of a national assembly to determine the future of the country.
The huge crowd that gathered on 26 May 1920 acclaimed fifteen of their leaders, including key members of the Istiqlal, as the delegation which would demand a face-to-face meeting with Wilson where the madhbata would be formally presented.51 It was also agreed that the delegation should be headed by the elderly and highly respected Yusuf Suwaydi and would include both Sunni and Shi‘i nationalists from Baghdad and Kadhimayn, the latter headed by Muhammad al-Sadr. After these formalities, the mass demonstration began to parade through the main streets of the city chanting anti-British and pro-independence slogans. By mid-afternoon it was becoming extremely hot and, it being the month of Ramadan, the demonstrators had neither eaten nor drunk since before sunrise. The mood of the crowd now became boisterous and unruly. So Colonel Frank Balfour, the military governor of the city, decided to send some armoured cars into the streets as a show of force. Predictably, stones began to fly and in the course of the ensuing mêlée two protestors were injured and a blind man was run over by one of the armoured cars and killed.
Meanwhile, Ja‘far Abu al-Timman was sending messages to Karbela’ and Najaf describing the growing unrest in Baghdad, the success of the interdenominational mauluds and the decision to confront Wilson with the madhbata. The Grand Mujtahid replied to Ja‘far, congratulating him on the campaign but also counselling the need to ‘protect your fellow citizens, the People of the Book [i.e. Jews and Christians], and uphold their liberty, property and dignity, respecting the honour of their places of worship as the Prophet advises us’.52
That such an admonition was necessary reflected the reality that by no means all the citizens of Baghdad were unsympathetic to continued British control. Indeed, on receiving news of the mandate, the leaders of both the Jewish and Christian communities had sent telegrams to King George V, thanking him for his government’s action.53 The reasons for this are not difficult to understand. In the case of the Christian communities, they were aware of the terrible massacres that fellow believers had suffered at the hands of some Muslims (especially the Kurds) during the chaos of the recent war; many of them feared that without the protection offered by the British mandate, they in turn might fall victim to some form of harassment or persecution by an Islamic state. In the case of the large Jewish community, they had seen their hopes of fair treatment under Muslim rulers dashed during the war and now there was the additional concern that they might, in some way, become scapegoats for the Zionist project in Palestine – in spite of the fact that Zionism was a project for which most of them had little sympathy.
Class and culture were also factors. Although there were thousands of poor Jews and Christian Arabs, the Jewish and Christian communities also included some of the richest citizens in Baghdad. As such they saw the British, with their own rigid and seemingly well-ordered class system, as a natural protector of their interests while, for their part, the British officer class resident in the city had a natural affinity towards the culture of Christians and Jews, many of whom shared their interests in music and literature and possessed a similar general world outlook. As a result, the occupiers generally treated the Jews and Christians with more respect and were more sensitive to their religious beliefs, property rights and economic interests than they were towards the Muslim inhabitants.54
However, the Islamic movement for independence continued to work hard to win over, or at least, neutralise, any opposition from the Jewish and Christian communities. On 29 May Shirazi issued the following proclamation which was carried by messengers to all the main towns and cities of Iraq and which ended with a renewed call to respect and protect the interests of Jews and Christians.
To my brother Iraqis,
Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings. Let it be known that your brothers in Baghdad, Kadhimayn, Najaf, Karbala’ and other parts of Iraq have agreed amongst themselves to unite and to organize peaceful demonstrations. These demonstrations have attracted mass support while also maintaining public order, demanding their rights to an Independent Iraq and, God willing, an Islamic government with one objective – that every part of Iraq sends to the Capital, Baghdad, a madhbata for its rights and agreeing with those who are heading for Baghdad from its surrounding areas. It is the duty of all Muslims to be in agreement with your brothers and their noble principles. But take care not to disturb the peace or to hide yourselves away or to fall into disagreement with each other such that your goals would become sour and your rights, which the moment of achieving is now in your hands, would fall into ruination. And I entrust you with the safe keeping of all the other religious communities and sects which are in your towns, with full regard for their persons, wealth and lands and never do any harm to one of them. May God give you success according to his will. Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings.
Muhammad Taqi al Shirazi
10 Ramadan 1338 [29 May 1920]55
Shirazi’s call to respect the interests of the ‘the other religious communities’ was taken seriously by the independence movement in Baghdad. Wilson reported to the India Office that ‘extremists’ had been active recently. Not only had great efforts been made to unite the Sunnis and Shi‘is against the occupation but ‘effusive demonstrations in favour of native Christians were recently made by Mohammedan religious leaders on the occasion of the Corpus Christi procession in Baghdad’. Also Jewish and Christian coffee shops had been ‘inundated’ by circulars such as the following:
To all our Brothers, Christian and Jewish fellow citizens.
It is to be made clear to you, our brothers, that we in the country are partners in happiness and misery. We are brothers and our ancestors lived in friendship and mutual help. Do not consider in any way that the demonstrations carried out by the citizens affect, in any way, your rights. We continue to value and respect our friendship. All the demonstrations being made do not indicate a lack of respect for you or any citizen. We have no other object than to claim from the present government the fulfilment of its pledges to the Iraqi nation which it has published many times in the newspapers. We therefore invite you to take part with us in everything that is good for the nation.56
However, not all the Muslim citizens of Baghdad were swept up in the growing enthusiasm for Unity and Independence. The venerable Naqib of Baghdad, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani, religious head of the Sunni community, expressed his dismay at the prevailing mood of fraternisation between ‘his’ people and the Shi‘is to Gertrude Bell. ‘I tell you’, he expostulated, ‘beware of the Shi‘is,’ adding, unconvincingly, that ‘I have no animosity against the Shi‘i sect … But turn your eyes on the pages of history and you will see that the salient characteristic of the Shi‘is is their levity … Idolatry and mutability are combined in them.’57 There were not a few among the Baghdad Sunni ashraf, rich men and great landowners on the Tigris, who shared his opinion; but for the time being they largely kept their opinions to themselves.
On learning of the nationalists’ intention to present their madhbata, Wilson agreed to a meeting with the delegates at the Baghdad serai, the headquarters of the British Civil Administration, on 2 June. However, claiming that the fifteen nationalist delegates were merely a group of ‘self-appointed politicians’, he also invited forty prominent ‘moderate’ Baghdadis who would, so he hoped, overwhelm radical opinion in a show of pro-British enthusiasm.
On the evening of the great event, Wilson, accompanied by the military governor of Baghdad, Colonel Balfour, the judicial secretary Bonham Carter and Lieutenant Colonel Howell, the revenue secretary, arrived at the serai in their well-pressed uniforms and solar topees. The occasion got off to a bad start: outside the building they were met by a crowd of rowdy school students and townsmen who shouted abuse at them. Inside, the atmosphere, like the actual temperature, was torrid. Over 100°f in the shade, the angry mood of the delegates and their supporters was exacerbated by the Ramadan fast, exceptionally trying when it fell in the summer period.58 Moreover, once inside the serai, Wilson and his entourage were disconcerted to find that only a handful – nine, actually – of the forty pro-British notables, had dared to turn up. It was clearly going to be a difficult encounter. Nevertheless, undaunted by the evident failure of his plan to pack the meeting, Wilson – whose self-assurance had recently been fortified by the award of a knighthood – proceeded to hold forth at great length and with considerable aplomb in English, followed by an Arabic text which had been prepared by Gertrude Bell.
