The Poisoned City, page 34
47. David Otto Schwake, Emily Garner, Owen R. Strom, Amy Pruden, and Marc A. Edwards, “Legionella DNA Markers in Tap Water Coincident with a Spike in Legionnaires’ Disease in Flint, MI,” Environmental Science & Technology Lett. 3, no. 9 (2016): 311–15. See also William J. Rhoads, Emily Garner, Pan Ji, Ni Zhu, Jeffrey Parks, David Otto Schwake, Amy Pruden, and Marc Edwards, “Distribution System Operational Deficiencies Coincide with Reported Legionnaires’ Disease Clusters in Flint, Michigan,” Environmental Science & Technology 51, no. 20 (2017): 11986–95.
48. Flint Water Advisory Task Force, “Final Report,” March 2016.
49. G. Brenda Byrne, Sarah McColm, Shawn P. McElmurry, Paul E. Kilgore, Joanne Sobeck, Rick Sadler, Nancy G. Love, and Michele S. Swanson, “Prevalence of Infection-Competent Serogroup 5 Legionella pneumophila within Premise Plumbing in Southeast Michigan,” mBio 9, no. 1 (February 6, 2018); and Sammy Zahran, Shawn P. McElmurry, Paul E. Kilgore, David Mushinski, Jack Press, Nancy G. Love, Richard C. Sadler, and Michele S. Swanson, “Assessment of the Legionnaires’ Disease Outbreak in Flint, Michigan,” PNAS (February 2018).
50. It was Harvey Hollins who made the request, the governor’s urban affairs specialist who saw the warning email from Jim Henry at the Genesee County Health Department. McElmurry said that Hollins told him that money for the study “was no issue, no problem.” Karen Bouffard, “Flint Water Switch Led to Most Legionnaires’ Cases,” Detroit News, February 5, 2018, updated February 6, 2018. The research team worked in partnership with Flint residents and was supported with funding from the MDHHS, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences, Wayne State University, Michigan State University, and the University of Michigan. It also discovered that the specific Legionella strain that was found in Flint residences was not one that was detected by ordinary Legionella tests. After Flint returned to a Lake Huron water source, the prevalence of Legionella bacteria in local homes fell back to normal levels. In response to the studies, an MDHHS spokesperson issued a statement, using the acronym for the research team’s formal name, the Flint Area Community Health and Environment Partnership: “By publishing these inaccurate, incomplete studies at this point, FACHEP has done nothing to help the citizens of Flint and has only added to the public confusion on this issue.” It also submitted a rebuttal. MDHHS discontinued funding for the studies in December 2017—it provided $3.1 million in 2016 and had promised $1 million more—after the researchers rejected the oversight of an outside firm, KWR Watercycle Research Institute. MDHHS hired KWR to provide an “external, independent third party” review of the studies after they were released. It’s worth noting that even as MDHHS director Nick Lyon faced criminal charges for the agency’s role in the Legionnaires’ outbreak, including for involuntary manslaughter, he was still directing the agency all this time. Likewise with Dr. Eden Wells, who continued in her role as chief medical executive while she faced charges. In November 2017, a few months before the studies were released, McElmurry was a witness for the prosecution in the preliminary exams against Wells and Lyon.
51. Edwards went so far as to file a formal complaint with Michigan regulators, arguing that McElmurry used false pretenses to secure substantial grant funding. It specifically described “his lack of competence and expertise” and suggested that he appropriated another person’s ideas in one of his research proposals. An aggressive case against him and his team was further developed on FlintWaterStudy.org, indiciating that their research was leading to trumped-up criminal charges against MDHHS officials—two of whom Edwards had backed up with testimony for the defense during their preliminary examinations. The Virginia Tech team pointed to its two peer-reviewed studies that said that the Flint River switch “was one key factor contributing to the Legionnaires’ Disease outbreak and associated deaths,” but it also emphasized that “At no point did anyone at MDHHS or the governor’s office discourage or impede our teams ground-breaking research that helped reveal the Flint Legionella outbreak” (“FACHEP vs. The People of the State of Michigan: Part I Dr. Shawn McElmurry,” FlintWaterStudy.org, March 29, 2018). McElmurry and his FACHEP team (the Flint Area Community Health and Environment Partnership) passionately defended themselves. “The claims made against our group are false and they are examples of unprofessional and destructive conduct.… It is very unfortunate when individuals resort to personal and unfounded attacks. Such attacks do not help us advance understanding or help the people of Flint. Rather, they confuse, contribute to rumors and create more harm. Sadly, there is a well-established pattern of distortions and misinformation by some of the individuals and investigators associated with Flint.” (Statement in Response to False Accusations about FACHEP, March 30, 2018). The multidisciplinary FACHEP team included experts from the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Colorado State University, the Henry Ford Health System, and Kettering University, one of whom was Dr. Laura Sullivan. FACHEP also worked closely with Flint residents to carry out their work. In a separate news release, Wayne State University also responded to the allegations: “We have the utmost respect for the commitment and character of Dr. McElmurry and the FACHEP research team. As scientists and members of the community, we all have a responsibility to maintain the highest standards in all we do. We have no doubt that Dr. McElmurry and his colleagues take this responsibility very seriously, and work tirelessly toward these goals for the public good” (Wayne State University statement on accusation, press release, Wayne State University, April 4, 2018).
52. Leonard N. Fleming, “WSU Prof: Flint Water Switch Prompted Outbreak,” Detroit News, November 15, 2017.
53. Melissa Mays, written testimony to the Michigan Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Public Health Emergency, Flint Public Hearing, Flint, Mich., March 29, 2016.
54. Taylor became part of a lawsuit against McLaren. Goodenough, “Legionnaires’ Outbreak in Flint”; and Kidd v. McLaren Flint Hospital, Case No. 16-106199-NO, Genesee County Circuit Court. Taylor wasn’t the only patient whose Legionnaires’ diagnosis may have been buried. Betty Marble, a sixty-eight-year-old woman from Grand Blanc, died during her second visit to McLaren in March 2015. Her death certificate cites cardiac arrest brought on by septic shock due to pneumonia. Her medical files twice mention Legionella. As Chastity Pratt Dawsey pointed out in Bridge Magazine (“In Flint, Questions About Legionnaires’ Death Toll,” June 28, 2016), the hospital was well aware of its Legionella problem at this point, but it didn’t try to test Marble for the disease until her second visit, just days before she died. By that point, she was unable to produce urine for a test, and a throat culture was ruled inconclusive. As one of her sons told Dawsey, “Why didn’t they tell us they had Legionella in their hospital and they were testing her for it?” It’s stories like this one—along with a 64 percent spike in pneumonia and flu cases in 2014—that have left many wondering if the official toll of Legionnaires’ disease leaves out many who had contracted it. In early 2016, McLaren announced that it was spending $300,000 on an upgrade to its water system.
55. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Kerner Report, p. 20.
56. The jobs program was called Flint WaterWorks, and it was funded by private donations. Young people were paid for their work on door-to-door outreach and mapping lead service lines. Kathleen Gray, “Message from Flint to Trump: Where the Hell Have You Been?,” Detroit Free Press, September 14, 2016; and Amy Crawford, “In Flint, Providing Safe Water Is a Full-Time Job,” CityLab, January 25, 2017.
57. Susan Selasky, “Ways to Cut Water Use in the Kitchen.” Compiled with help from the Free Press Test Kitchen, Erin Powell, and Bethany Thayer, Detroit Free Press, February 14, 2016, p. 7A; Susan Selasky, “Program Gets Flint Residents to the Grocery,” Detroit Free Press, February 14, 2016, p. 7A.
58. Susan Hedman, written testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C., March 15, 2016, https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Hedman-Statement-3-15-Flint-Water-II.pdf.
59. Oona Goodin-Smith, “U. of Mich. 8-Part Course Explores Flint Water Crisis,” USA Today College, January 22, 2016; and University of Michigan–Flint, “Flint Water Crisis Course—January 21, 2016,” University of Michigan–Flint, uploaded to YouTubeVideo, 2.06.10 hours, January 27, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulowd6DgS-k&list=PLXTcWgqRYbI15MwCzeQhFK1ASsxoI416u&index=12.
60. Some of the material that follows first appeared in slightly different form in the New Republic (“Flint Prepares to Be Left Behind Once More,” March 3, 2015).
61. Matthew Dolan, “Scared Residents Search for Hope,” Detroit Free Press, January 24, 2016, pp. 1A, 13A.
62. Mark Tower, “$2 Billion for Blight Elimination Efforts Approved by Congress,” MLive—Flint Journal, December 18, 2015. As for the neighborhood-specific efforts, there was, for example, a series of public meetings to develop the South Flint Community Plan, such as one on February 17, 2016, at the Atherton East community center that included a presentation and discussion around the history of public housing in Flint, according to a contemporary status on the City of Flint Master Plan Facebook page.
63. Lindsey Smith, “Not Safe to Drink,” Michigan Radio, December 15, 2015.
CHAPTER 11: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
1. Rick Snyder, “2016 Michigan State of the State Transcript,” State of Michigan website, January 19, 2016, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2016_Michigan_State_of_the_State_Transcript_511676_7.pdf.
2. A few other notable points from Snyder’s speech: in his telling of the Flint story, he said that the crisis “began in the spring of 2013, when the Flint City Council voted seven to one to buy water from the Karegnondi Water Authority,” omitting the fact that the council vote did not have any power behind it, and he also repeated the misleading claim that the Detroit water department kicked Flint off its water. Picking up on the infrastructure study that he discussed, Snyder later issued an executive order that required the state to confer with local leadership when it did road projects, as it could be an efficient and cost-effective opportunity to replace or maintain underground infrastructure.
3. Lindsay Knake, “‘Arrest Gov. Snyder’ Protestors Chant Outside His Ann Arbor Condo,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 18, 2016; Ryan Stanton, “Anti-Snyder Messages Pop Up Around Governor’s Downtown Ann Arbor Condo,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 28, 2016; Ryan Stanton, “Gov. Rick Snyder Heckled at Ann Arbor Restaurant over Flint Water Crisis,” MLive—Ann Arbor News, January 28, 2016; and Daniel Bethencourt, “Crowd Calls for Snyder’s Arrest Outside His Ann Arbor Home,” Detroit Free Press, January 18, 2016, updated January 19, 2016.
4. Kathryn Ross, “Government Run as a Business Doesn’t Work,” letter to the editor, Detroit Free Press, January 31, 2016.
5. Ingrid Jacques, “Gov on Flint Crisis: ‘It Will Always Be Terrible,’” Detroit News, January 24, 2016. Snyder also said: “You don’t sleep well … Nothing is as bad as what the people of Flint face themselves, having to deal with bottled water or filters or concerns about lead levels. I mean, they are the ones who are suffering the most. How I’m suffering through this is nothing in relationship to what they are going through.”
6. Ibid. Specifically, Snyder wondered about calling in the National Guard on October 1, 2015, the day that the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services reversed itself on the blood-lead levels of Flint children.
7. Some of the material in this section originally appeared in slightly different form in the Boston Review (“The Struggle for Accountability in Flint,” February 2, 2016).
8. Chad Selewski, “Michigan Gets an F grade in 2015 State Integrity Investigation,” Center for Public Integrity, November 9, 2015, updated November 12, 2015.
9. It was part of cuts across Michigan by MLive, the umbrella company for eight Advance-owned newspapers and a statewide website, eliminating twenty-nine “content positions,” and it came on the heels of buyouts at the Detroit papers that removed a couple dozen veteran journalists from the state’s two largest papers. This material comes from reporting the author did at the time for the Columbia Journalism Review (“Michigan’s MLive Cuts 29 Positions in Latest ‘Restructuring,’” January 7, 2016).
10. Paul Egan, “Red Flag on Corrosion Control Overlooked,” Detroit Free Press, January 22, 2016, pp. 1A, 11A. On February 1, 2015, the governor had received a briefing paper from the environmental department, attributing GM’s switch back to Lake Huron only to the fact that its water was softer than that of the Flint River. It made no mention of corrosion control.
11. In response to queries by Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of staff, the MDHHS’s Nancy Peeler emailed an update about childhood blood-lead levels in Flint. She directed the Maternal, Infant and Early Childhood Home Visiting program. “Upon review, we don’t believe our data demonstrates an increase in lead poisoning rates that might be attributable to the change in water for Flint,” she wrote in a July 28, 2015, email. This was sent just a few days after Wurfel sent Muchmore an update about the drinking water: “… the bottom line is that residents of Flint do not need to worry about lead in their water supply, and DEQ’s recent sampling does not indicate an eminent [sic] health threat from lead or copper,” Wurfel wrote. To which Muchmore replied simply, “Thanks.” Bridge Staff, “Flint Crisis Timeline: Part 3,” Bridge Magazine, March 1, 2016.
12. Ibid.
13. Egan, “Red Flag on Corrosion Control Overlooked.”
14. Ibid.
15. That included the Edward R. Murrow Award (Large Market Radio-News Documentary cagetory) and an Alfred I. DuPont–Columbia University Award.
16. Some of the material in this chapter originally appeared in two different articles for the Columbia Journalism Review (“In Flint, a New Era for One of the Oldest Community Media Outlets in the US,” August 30, 2016, and “How Covering the Flint Water Crisis Changed Michigan Radio,” February 16, 2016). For Michigan Radio, one of the consequences of its coverage was a shift in the relationship with Governor Rick Snyder’s office. The office “has not been pleased with all our coverage,” said news director Vincent Duffy, referring in particular to elements of the “Not Safe to Drink” documentary and its online supplements. After the documentary aired, he said, the governor’s office indicated it would communicate over email but would no longer agree to recorded phone interviews, including after the State of the State address. Dave Murray, Gov. Snyder’s press secretary, said that the office “had some concerns that we talked to them about, and we’re working on it together.”
17. Matthew L. Wald, “Out-of-Court Settlement Reached over Love Canal,” New York Times, June 22, 1994; and Tom Beauchamp, Case Studies in Business, Society, and Ethics, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), chapter titled “Hooker Chemical and Love Canal,” available online courtesy of Stephen Hicks, Ph.D., http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Love-Canal-Hooker-Chemical.pdf (last accessed February 24, 2018).
18. Danny Gogal, “25 Years of Environmental Justice at the EPA,” EPA blog, November 6, 2017; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Justice: Learn About Environmental Justice,” n.d., https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice, last accessed March 4, 2018.
19. The U.S. Supreme Court cited the concept of “disparate impact” in a major decision about housing in Texas, pointing out that the consequences of overt discrimination and unconscious bias have essentially the same results. (Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 2015.) When the Michigan Civil Rights Commission investigated Flint’s water disaster, it owned up to its own susceptibility to this by not grasping the seriousness of the situation sooner. “What we will do, what we must do, is acknowledge that in the earlier stages of this crisis the people of Flint were calling out for help and regretfully, we did not answer the call.… It does not matter whether we failed to act because we concluded that, because there were also white victims race was not playing a role, because we saw the crisis only in economic terms, or because we saw water quality as a scientific issue only. In fact, even if we failed to act because we never heard about the protests in Flint, it would only expose our lack of awareness of an issue that was vitally important to one of the constituencies we are supposed to protect” (“The Flint Water Crisis,” Michigan Civil Rights Commission, p. 117).
20. Wendy N. Davis, “Who’s to Blame for Poisoning of Flint’s Water?” American Bar Association Journal, November 2016.
21. The announcement came on Friday, April 6, 2018. The state argued that “Flint’s water continues to test the same as or better than similar cities across the state and country. The State of Michigan could have ended bottled water in early September 2017 in accordance with the mediated Concerned Pastors for Social Action Settlement agreed to by the City of Flint, State of Michigan, Concerned Pastors for Social Action, and other stakeholder groups. However, the State of Michigan continued funding the water distribution locations over the past seven months and partnered with the City of Flint, local churches and other non-profit partners, the Food Bank, and the United Way to keep bottled water available until even greater amounts of water quality testing through the community could occur” (State of Michigan Commitment to City of Flint, Michigan.gov, April 6, 2018). Bottled water would be given out until the supply ran out, which led to a rush on the sites that remained open; they were out of water by the following Monday. Residents and elected leaders expressed frustration and anger at the sudden closure of the “pods,” and many traveled to Lansing to protest at the state capitol. U.S. Rep. Dan Kildee’s statement: “The state should provide Flint families with bottled water until all of the lead service lines have been replaced. Flint families rightfully do not trust state government, who created this crisis and lied to our community about the safety of the water. Continuing to provide bottled water service until all lead service lines are replaced will give peace of mind to residents and help restore Flint’s trust in government. Until then, I understand why Flint families still do not trust the water coming out of their taps.” Mayor Karen Weaver wrote a letter to the governor that urged him to reconsider the closure. She told a Detroit News reporter that besides wanting to “re-establish trust when trust has been broken,” she was concerned that lead “particulates can get shaken loose” during the citywide work of pipe replacement, causing a spike in the water supply.
