The Neutron and the Bomb, page 55
After this unpromising start, the two men went to New York for the UN gathering which was held in the gymnasium of Hunter College in the Bronx. Whereas Chadwick was the sole British scientific adviser, in the American section were his old friends Tolman, Compton, Urey, Bacher and Oppenheimer. They all sat through Baruch’s speech40 which opened with the phrase, ‘We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead’, and continued in dramatic fashion for well over an hour. To Chadwick, it seemed that Baruch saw himself ‘in his sere years as Moses descending with a message for the salvation of humanity’.38 Perhaps as a result of listening to Lord Inverchapel, Chadwick55 did not think that ‘the Russians would agree to anything’. After six months of debate and posturing, the Russians effectively stymied the American plan.
From the narrower perspective of Anglo-American relations, the sterile outcome of the UN debate mattered less than the passage of the final McMahon bill in August 1946. With each revision and amendment, the bill had become more restrictive.40 For example, the section originally titled ‘Dissemination of Information’ had been changed to ‘Control of Information’; the attempt to distinguish between ‘basic scientific’ and ‘related technical’ data had been abandoned and it would all be ‘Restricted Data’. Chadwick had been the first to notice this hardening of American security, and had wanted to approach Senator McMahon privately38 — a move that was vetoed by the Embassy for fear of creating worse political difficulties. In Chadwick’s opinion,60 the British were suffering ‘disadvantages from our strict adherence to the spirit of the Quebec Agreement’. The Americans, on the other hand, ‘have for some time refused to fulfil their obligations towards us. There is, in effect, no longer any real co-operation between us, except as regards the Combined Development Trust, from which the US have derived far greater benefits than have accrued to us.’ While he did not think it was wise ‘to apply pressure for a more active co-operation... to do nothing is to convince the Americans that we acquiesce in, and are reconciled to, the inferior position which they are trying to force upon us’.
The Foreign Office inclination, as expressed by Makins60 from the British Embassy, was to hold fire until President Truman had appointed the US Atomic Energy Commission, for until then there was no unified authority with which to deal. Chadwick60, while greatly respecting Makins’ opinions, flatly disagreed with him on this occasion. In his view the AEC ‘will not be composed of men who carry much weight.’ That summer, Washington was rife with rumour about who would be chosen as the chairman of the new Commission, and the name of David Lilienthal gradually emerged from the pack, which included General Marshall and Joseph P. Kennedy.61 While Chadwick60 thought it possible that Lilienthal would accept the chairmanship, he believed the rest of the Commission were ‘likely to be men of less repute’, and would be surprised ‘if any scientist of high standing’ joined. ‘I cannot believe’, he continued, ‘that such a Commission will have much influence on international policy,’ and questioned whether they would be often consulted. When they were, he thought their main role would be to provide cover for Secretary of State Byrnes. He had become thoroughly mistrustful of Washington and could not understand ‘why Makins is so confident that the U.S.-U.K. documents will be communicated to the Commission, for it is contrary to all our experience’.
It was true that few American politicians knew about the Quebec Agreement, and only Dean Acheson62 seemed to be troubled that the US Government ‘having made an agreement from which it had gained immeasurably, was not keeping its word and performing its obligations’. While Makins saw him as Britain’s most likely ally,60 Acheson could not seek a change in policy to ease his conscience, and the idea that Britain would be treated on an equal basis with other nations did not cause the political pulse in Washington to miss a beat.
References (chapter 17)
While I have used original documents where feasible, the material involved is voluminous and often still classified. I have, therefore, had to rely heavily on the official UK history by Gowing and the official US Atomic Energy Commission history by Hewlett and Anderson. In both cases, relevant chapters are given as separate references.
1 Harris, K. (1995). Into power, 1945. In, Attlee, pp. 255-91. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
2 Gowing, M. (1974). Statements by the prime minister and Mr Churchill on the atomic bomb, 6 August 1945. In Independence and deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 14-8. Macmillan, London.
3 Oliphant, M.L. (1947). Rutherford and the modern world. Proceedings of the Physical Society, 59, 144-55.
4 Chadwick, J. (7/9/45). Letter to H.M. Wilson. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
5 Chadwick, J. (8/9/45). Letter to W. Akers. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
6 Chadwick, J. (14/9/45). Minute to W. Akers re German scientists. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
7 Notes on meeting of sub-committee September 10, 1943 (R.C.T.). RG 77, File 334, Box 60. NA2.
8 Chadwick, J. (20/2/46). Letter to J. Anderson. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
9 Sime, R.L. (1996). Suppressing the past. In Lise Meitner: a life in physics, pp. 326-46. University of California Press.
10 Chadwick, J. (21/3/46). Letter to D. Rickett. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
11 Aide-mémoire of Hyde Park agreement (18/9/44). PREM3/139/8A, PRO.
12 Chadwick, J. (10/9/45). Letter to P. Moon. AB 1/485, PRO.
13 Chadwick, J. (14/8/45). Letter to C.F. Powell. CHAD IV, 2/10, CAC.
14 Peierls, R.E. and Moon, P. (5/10/45). Letter to J. Chadwick. RG 77, Box 85, file 201, NA2.
15 Peierls, R.E. and Moon, P. (29/10/45). Letter to J. Chadwick. RG 77, Box 85, file 201, NA2.
16 Memorandum by British scientists at Los Alamos (1945). CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
17 Hewlett, R.G. and Anderson, O.E. (1990). Controlling the atom: from policy to action. In A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: the new world, pp. 428-81. University of California Press.
18 Harris, K. (1995). Attlee, p. 401. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
19 Gowing, M. (1974). Labour’s machinery of government. In Independence and deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 19-59. Macmillan, London.
20 The Times, 22/8/45.
21 Rickett, D.H.F. (24/8/45). Cable to J. Chadwick. CHAD IV, 10/42, CAC.
22 Chadwick, J. (10/9/45). ANCAM cable. CAB 134/6, PRO.
23 Gowing, M. (1974). Deterrence. In Independence and deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 160-206. Macmillan, London.
24 Penney, W. (1945). Report on atomic bomb damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. CHAD II, 3/17A, CAC.
25 Oliphant, M.L. (1/10/45). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 25/1, CAC.
26 Chadwick, J. (14/9/45). Letter to D. Rickett. CHAD IV, 10/42, CAC.
27 Chadwick, J. (5/10/45). Letter to D. Rickett. CHAD IV, 10/42, CAC.
28 Newton, V.J. (1991). The Cambridge spies. Madison Books, New York.
29 Rhodes, R. (1995). Dark sun: the making of the hydrogen bomb. Simon & Schuster, New York.
30 Cockcroft, J.D. (1945). Memo on Dr Nunn May. CHAD IV, 6/29, CAC.
31 Intelligence report (1945). Estimate of the knowledge of Metlab operations possessed by Evergreen scientists. RG 77, Box 60, file 334, NA2.
32 Groves, L.R. (3/2/45). Notes on meeting with J. Chadwick, 20/1/45. RG 77, Box 85, file 201, NA2.
33 Boyle, A. (1979). The fourth man, p. 65. The Dial Press, New York.
34 May, A.N. (29/8/44). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 25/1, CAC.
35 West, N. (1989). Molehunt: searching for Soviet spies in MI5, p. 160. William Morrow, New York.
36 Gowing, M. (1974). External policy: brief hope of interdependence. In Independence and deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 63-86. Macmillan, London.
37 Chadwick, J. (19/12/45). Letter to D. Rickett. CHAD IV, 11/56, CAC.
38 Gowing, M. (1974). External policy: hopes are dupes. In Independence and deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 87-130. Macmillan, London.
39 Chadwick, J. (29/4/46). Letter to Lord Portal. AB 1/353, PRO.
40 Hewlett, R.G. and Anderson, O.E. (1990). The legislative battle. In A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: the new world, pp. 482-530. University of California Press.
41 Chadwick, J. (6/3/46). Letter to R.E. Peierls. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
42 Peierls, R.E. (12/3/46). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
43 Chadwick, J. (2/4/46). Letter to H. Massey. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
44 Association of Scientific Workers (1946). Press release re. Dr Nunn May. CHAD IV, 6/29, CAC.
45 Chadwick, J. (21/3/46). Letter to M.L. Oliphant. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
46 Oliphant, M.L. (23/3/46). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
47 Oliphant, M.L. (30/3/46). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
48 Oliphant, M.L. (2/1/46). Letter to J. Chadwick. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
49 Chadwick, J. (4/4/46). Letter to M.L. Oliphant. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
50 Chadwick, J. (11/4/46). Letter to E. Appleton. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
51 Chadwick, J. (22/3/46). Letter to J. Rotblat. CHAD I, 24/2, CAC.
52 New York Times, 11 March 1946.
53 Chadwick, J. (12/4/46). Letter to Lord Portal. AB 1/193, PRO.
54 Truman, H.S. (1956). Years of trial and hope, p. 12. Da Capo, New York.
55 Weiner, C. (1969). Sir James Chadwick, oral history. American Institute of Physics, College Park, Maryland.
56 Gowing, M. (1974). Independence and deterrence, Vol. 2, p. 6. Macmillan, London.
57 Hewlett, R.G. and Anderson, O.E. (1990). Last best hope. In A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: the new world, pp. 531-79. University of California Press.
58 Acheson, D. (1969). Present at the creation, p. 154. W.W. Norton, New York.
59 Dilks, D. (1972). The diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York.
60 Chadwick, J. (1946). Relations with the U.S.A. on atomic energy. Undated report. CHAD IV, 10/42, CAC.
61 Hewlett, R.G. and Anderson, O.E. (1990). A time of transition. In A history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: the new world, pp. 620-55. University of California Press.
62 Acheson, D. (1969). The Quebec Agreement. In Present at the creation, pp. 164-8. W.W. Norton, New York.
18 ~ Liverpool and Europe
The sojourn in America had lasted three years when Chadwick returned to his post as Professor of Physics in Liverpool. He had been trying to extricate himself from his post in Washington and the UN Atomic Energy Commission for some months, and finally ‘just packed up and left’.1 He had worked virtually every day during those tumultuous times, and unlike a returning soldier he could not simply unload his wartime responsibilities on returning to civilian life. He and Aileen sailed from New York on the Queen Mary in the high summer of 1946. The luxury liner had been used as a troop ship and was still not refitted to its prewar state. Sir James and Lady Chadwick were assigned a small cabin below decks with two bunks. The slight, unassuming, middle-aged, scientist had experienced many uncomfortable journeys during his extensive travels on the North American continent, and this was certainly preferable to another crossing by RAF bomber. Aileen was outraged on his behalf that the Embassy had not made better arrangements; she stormed off to find the purser, who was informed in no uncertain terms that her husband, the Nobel Prizewinner and leading nuclear physicist, Sir James Chadwick, would not be returning to England in such cramped quarters. Chadwick smiled meekly at the steward who returned with Aileen to move them into a refurbished stateroom. On their arrival at Southampton they were met by a car and driver from the Ministry of Supply. As they approached London, the car ran out of fuel. The driver had no coupons to purchase more petrol so that the Chadwicks had to complete their journey to Euston station by bus. It was the perfect introduction to the austerity of postwar Britain.
Chadwick’s friends in Liverpool were shocked to see how much his wartime efforts had taken out of him. He called on the new Vice-Chancellor, James Mountford, who noted in his diary that he had never seen a man ‘so physically, mentally and spiritually tired’2 as Chadwick was at that time. Mountford sensed that Chadwick ‘had plumbed such depths of moral decision as more fortunate men are never called upon even to peer into’, and as a consequence suffered ‘almost insupportable agonies of responsibility arising from his scientific work’. Other Liverpool academics were more self-righteous, and one member of the Physiology Department wrote to criticize him for showing so little sense of responsibility in helping to create such an awful weapon. In his reply, Chadwick3 did not attempt to justify his own contribution to the Manhattan Project, but restated his belief that the problems posed by atomic weapons could only be solved by international statesmen acting in concert. He pointed out that he and many of his colleagues had expended a great deal of effort in bringing these difficult issues before their political masters.
Although Chadwick was undoubtedly deeply affected by the advent of nuclear weapons and shared in the remorse which to some degree affected all those scientists who had worked on their development, he never contributed to public debate on the subject. In part, this was because he was an intensely private man who would never disclose his emotions even to close friends. There was also his official position as a government adviser, for which he took the ordinance of a civil servant and considered it improper ‘to state his own views at length’.3 While he did not hesitate to tell ministers and generals that an independent bomb was a necessary component for the British defence programme, he would have been perfectly content to be contradicted by them. Others might, and did, see his reserve as an abrogation of moral responsibility, but it was a position born of genuine humility, reinforced by innate shyness. When he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws from Liverpool University in 1947, the orator, who was perhaps acquainted with Chadwick’s opinion, remarked: ‘He has released the genie from the bottle; whether it works in our service or for our annihilation is for us, and not for him, to decide.’4
Although Chadwick had not been physically present in Liverpool for three years, he had attempted to maintain an interest in university affairs. His friend Sir Arnold McNair, who was Vice-Chancellor for most of the war years, would write to him in Washington with news about the Physics Department, the Liverpool Cancer Commission and occasional tittle-tattle. In return, Chadwick would send incisive opinions and suggestions about future university policies. He wrote to McNair5 in July 1944 following a dinner conversation with James Conant, the President of Harvard University, on the subject of university admissions. Conant had told him about Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs), which Chadwick thought would be a useful supplement to scholarship exams. He sent a package of materials to Liverpool, saying that he thought SATs would be especially good for assessing students from country schools, where the ‘syllabus and teaching did not reach the standards of the good private schools’. Chadwick sent such material through the diplomatic bag and was annoyed that it was subject to the same censorship as Tube Alloys communications. He pointed out that he was forced to use the diplomatic channel because ordinary mail took eight weeks to cross the Atlantic, which would effectively cut him off from Liverpool. He was worried that his university correspondence would be unduly restricted, making it ‘quite impossible for me to be any use to my university’.6 McNair wrote to him,7 at about the same time, trying to reassure him:
You really must not worry about your duty to the University... I am quite certain that the prestige which will in future, when the veil of secrecy is lifted, accrue to you and your Department, will amply repay any inconvenience which the University may have sustained by reason of your absence.
It will be remembered that Chadwick in 1944 was receiving monthly reports on Tube Alloys work from several British universities, as well as attempting to quell a virtual insurrection against Feather at the Cavendish: he was also dealing with regular university paperwork sent by Stanley Dumbell, the Registrar at Liverpool. In April 1944, Chadwick criticized8 the Faculty of Science report for being an uncoordinated document, where each department seemed to be plotting a separate future. He was disappointed that it contained no provision for a Chair in Theoretical Physics, ‘which, apart from its desirability per se, would form a link between Physics and Mathematics and, in time, Chemistry’. Regarding the Physics Department, he considered ‘the present laboratory and facilities are unworthy of our University. They do not rank with those offered by Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds or Bristol, say, but rather with one of the Welsh colleges.’ Sounding, for once, like a latter day Rutherford, Chadwick had no doubt that after the war his department could become very prominent: ‘I have the men — and more will come; all they need is apparatus and free time.’
The over-confidence was short-lived, and it soon became apparent after the war that there were more posts available than men of experience to fill them.9 It was proving difficult to bring some of the best scientists back from America, where they could command salaries at least double those in England. Even the illustrious Cavendish was having difficulty with recruitment; Sir Lawrence Bragg, Rutherford’s successor, contacted Chadwick in January 1946 about the Swiss physicist, Egon Bretscher, whom he wished to secure as a lecturer, but who was proving elusive. Bretscher was still at Los Alamos, where he was working on the ‘super’ or hydrogen bomb, and Chadwick found him very unsettled about his future. Setting himself up as a mediator, he wrote to Bragg10 that Bretscher could be troublesome on occasions ‘owing to his hypersensitivity to imaginary slights, neglect, etc., but he is undoubtedly very likeable and very able’. He thought the root of Bretscher’s uneasiness was that he had never had a position commensurate with his ability nor any settled future. ‘In addition’, Chadwick continued, ‘he has suffered by being a foreigner; in England we are too slow in absorbing good men.’ He suggested that Bragg offered him a Readership rather than a lectureship.
