Embracing Hope, page 11
So, the relationship between freedom and responsibility manifests itself in the fact that freedom is not simply “freedom from” but also simultaneously “freedom to,” and it’s taking responsibility that is precisely what the human being is free to do. Thus, we have to oppose Freud’s psychoanalysis with an analysis of being human in terms of being responsible. Nevertheless, this mode of being for man, which has its ultimate discernible foundation in the phenomenon of responsibility, is called existence. The result is that out of psychoanalysis comes existential analysis, which is the evaluation of human existence beyond being merely driven by our base instincts. One could argue that existence cannot be analyzed but, in fact, can only be “illuminated.” But we no longer understand analysis in the sense of Freud’s atomistic notion. Instead, we use the word “analysis” in the sense of emphasizing what is already implicit in the nature of existence.
However, the freedom that forms the basis of the intrinsic responsibility of human beings, and which is repeatedly seen and described by existential analysis—even in cases of neurotic states of being—this freedom is integral in nature: even where I am “driven by my instincts,” even there, freedom is still present—because I allow myself to be driven! The relinquishment of freedom and of its use is in itself a voluntary relinquishment. The abdication of the ego in favor of the id happens voluntarily. From this, we can conclude that freedom is capable of opposing the apparently unassailable “demonic powers” of the unconscious base instincts; indeed, that all instinctive behavior is from the outset already a structured behavior, shaped by the ego. If someone asks how it is possible for the ego to assert itself against the “demons,” then he fails to recognize the nature of the freedom of the ego as an existential freedom. But psychologism is characterized by the fact that it projects the spiritual phenomena down from their spiritual realm to the level of the merely psychological. However, having been projected in this way, they become ambiguous, and without reference to their spiritual content and with reference only to the psychological act, we can no longer ascertain whether they equate to a cultural achievement or simply a psychological symptom. Just as the shape of a circle on a flat plane is ambiguous—as it can also signify the projection from space of a two-dimensional circle, as well as a three-dimensional cylinder, a sphere or a cone—on the psychological level, there is no way of telling the difference between a Dostoevsky and any other epileptic. Consequently, this psychological projection robs our view of a whole dimension: the spiritual. But even the objectification of human existence means that we lose the dimension in which it exists. For in the moment in which we make the ego into an object, we lose its true character. This is also the inherent contradiction of behaviorism: it makes the intrinsic behavior of an individual congeal into a set of circumstances.
We must never forget that all objectification of human existence only affects the individual in “being as he is” [So-sein in German], but not in his true existence—“conscious being” [Dasein in German]. However, “conscious being” does not coincide with “being as he is”—it is not a matter of “being as we are,” but always “being able to be different.” Human existence already goes beyond its own state of “being as it is”; human existence never fully merges with its own factuality. Being human does not mean just being factual but being “facultative,” i.e., having options. Psychoanalysis, however, from its psychologistic and objectifying perspective, loses sight of human existence, because psychoanalysis targets only the psychological in its actuality and averts its gaze from the existential with its possibilities. In contrast, during our brief investigation, we have tried to indicate the necessary path which, in our picture of the human being, will allow us to see his existence as the truly human way of being—in other words, the path from psychoanalysis to existential analysis.*
Ex definitione, existential analysis focuses on an awareness of having responsibility. The human being has responsibility in light of the finite nature of his own life, though the ultimate finiteness of the human being is obvious in the temporality of his existence. It confronts us primarily as mortality. From this, however, we know that it is precisely mortality that accounts for the responsibility of the human being. For a person who is immortal could justifiably let all opportunities for actualizing value pass him by, because it would never be important for him to do a particular thing right now—he could just as well do it later. Only in the face of the temporal finality of our existence is it possible to invoke human responsibility in its full force with a kind of categorical imperative, such as the following: “Live as if you were living for the second time and as if you had acted the first time as wrongly as you are about to act now!”
But it is not so much about death or even what someone has in front of him, as about what that person has put behind him. It’s a matter of responsibility in the face of transience. Indeed, even this transience cannot impair the human willingness to take responsibility. Quite the opposite. It’s the potentialities for actualizing value that are transitory; but when we actualize them, we virtually save them into reality—into the reality of the past. For, in the past, they are “captured” in the sense of the double meaning which also implies “preserved,” as expressed in the Hegelian dialectic. This “being past” or “having been” is perhaps altogether the safest form of being, because what is in the past can never be removed from the world. Therefore, is it not precisely our responsibility to bring it into the world?
We have defined responsibility as the “wherefore” of freedom. The final question now arises: the question of responsibility “before whom.” And existential analysis does not have the answer to this question. It remains an open question. Existential analysis leaves it open, just like the door to transcendence, because it can only be a matter for existential analysis as a primarily psychotherapeutic method, as it were, to furnish the room of immanence—naturally, without blocking the door to transcendence. However, within transcendence is the absolute. And the absolute remains within transcendence. The transcendent is not in a dimension which existential analysis would dare to enter. Perhaps the absolute is not in a dimension at all, but is the coordinate system itself. In spite of this, an existential analysis which, in accordance with its task, does not dare to approach the absolute as such, must at least do one thing: it must make sure that the relative remains relativized. For it is likely that a purely immanent perspective that is not even aware of its proximity to the transcendent—that every purely immanent perspective—will be, from the outset, a distorting perspective. And even if theology has been accused of anthropomorphism, we don’t want to get to the point where anthropology can now be accused of theomorphism—in the sense that, in our theory of the essence of being human, once we have relativized the elements of fate in its biological, psychological and sociological aspects, we make that freedom absolute in itself! Thus, we see that even when the fear of biologism, psychologism and socialism has been exorcised, we are still threatened by one last danger: the danger of anthropologism.
Existential analysis, as such, was not able to answer the last question. The location to which it can bring a person is not a final stop, not the end of the line. But from this station, he will always be able to get a “direct connection” in the direction of the transcendent. Because this station is still located on the line towards the absolute, the absolute that can only be understood in terms of the religious experience.
What matters to us at this stage is to prove that there can be no contradiction between the experience of living responsibly for a non-religious person and for a religious person. In fact, the religious experience, the religious dimension, can only ever be a supplementary relationship.* We can see this precisely in how both the non-religious and the religious person experience their existence: the one as a straightforward task and therefore as an appeal to his responsibility, and the other—in a supplementary sense—also experiencing the entity that set the task, the task that is now experienced as a divine mission.
Even so, within the “space of immanence,” which is the sole concern of existential analysis, there is still a kind of borderline case regarding our responsibility “before whom or what,” i.e., the conscience. For the conscience is directed out from itself and beyond immanence; we see this clearly as soon as we understand conscience as a kind of moral instinct.
If I set myself the task of producing paper bags to package a product, then I will require a person with a level of intelligence, which is, after all, so low that I could entrust the task to one of the “idiots”* I am currently treating with occupational therapy in the psychiatric clinic. Conversely, if I set myself the task of constructing a machine that will manufacture these paper bags automatically, I will definitely need people with a higher level of intelligence to build this machine. It is similar with the so-called “wisdom of instincts.” As you may know, there is a species of beetle in which the females cut pieces out of leaves in a particular fashion (in accordance with an “irrational curve” that baffles even mathematicians) and then roll them up to make sacs into which they can safely lay their eggs. Should we not ask ourselves, “Isn’t it incredible what this ‘wise’ instinct can achieve?” This wisdom must be at an extremely high level to have produced such an instinct. Thus, we can see how instinct, even moral instinct—conscience—is pointing beyond itself and beyond immanence into transcendence.
Earlier, when we were speaking about a religious person as someone who, so to speak, experiences more and sees more because he additionally experiences the entity that sets the task, then certainly we must not infer any arrogance from the “superiority” of the religious experience vis-a-vis the non-religious experience. Rather, the only justifiable attitude of the religious person towards the non-religious person is tolerance. For, after all, the attitude of a sighted person towards a blind person is not disdain but compassion and a willingness to help.
But we’re talking about the religious person as if he were the sighted person in relation to the non-religious person. And that is wrong; how wrong is illustrated by the following allegory. If it is true that people in life are like actors on the stage, then let’s remember that the actor—blinded by the spotlight—does not see the audience or the auditorium, but a large black hole. He never sees “before whom” he is performing. And is it not the same for the average person? He too—blinded by the “light” of everyday life—does not see “before whom” he bears the responsibility for his existence (as an actor bears his role). He cannot see before whom he acts! And still there are always people who think that precisely in the spot where we see “nothing,” precisely there sits the Great Spectator who steadfastly watches us. These are the people who call out to us, “Watch out, you’re on stage and the curtain is up!”
Dedicated to my friend, Hubert Gsur.*
* Reprinted with the kind permission of Hogrefe Verlag.
* We are by no means overlooking the social factor. Not even in relation to the development of neuroses. However, the psychotherapist cannot of himself bring about a revolution. What he can influence is only the attitude of the patient to his social fate. However, a change would certainly activate the patient, not only in his personal life, but also in his political attitude. [Note in Frankl’s original published version of the text]
** Greek term for “political animal.”
* [. . .] In many cases, Freud’s findings are still valid. His dream theory, for example, will remain valid. However, it is not I who dream, it is the id that is dreaming me, and within the dynamic of the id, psychoanalytic theory still applies. In addition, please note that a therapeutic effect in psychotherapy, and indeed within psychiatry in general, does not prove that the theoretical assumptions are correct. Psychoanalysis is certainly effective, but probably because it ultimately contains an implicit appeal to the free and responsible ego that it likewise assumes to be present. Insulin shock treatment for schizophrenia is also based on untenable theoretical assumptions, yet has still proved to be effective. [Note in Frankl’s original published version of the text]
* It would be important to make the relationship between the religious and the non-religious person easier by highlighting the supplementary (instead of opposing) nature of the relationship. In terms of the practical consequences, there must be a common denominator and a shared platform; in the space of immanence, religious and non-religious people can come together to find common ground for acting together. [Note in Frankl’s original published version of the text]
* A medical term that was used at the time in Austria and Germany but is no longer in use. It denoted a person with severely reduced cognitive abilities.
* Hubert Gsur was an Austrian poet and a member of the resistance in Vienna. He was executed by the Nazi regime in 1944. A street in Vienna is named after him.
ABOUT VIKTOR E. FRANKL
Viktor E. Frankl was professor of neurology and psychiatry at the University of Vienna and, for twenty-five years, head of the Vienna Neurological Policlinic. The logotherapy/existential analysis founded by him is also known as the Third Viennese Direction of Psychotherapy. He held visiting professorships at Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of Texas at Dallas, and the University of Pittsburgh, and was a Distinguished Professor of Logotherapy at the US International University, San Diego, California.
Frankl was born in Vienna in 1905. At the University of Vienna, he earned a doctorate in medicine and later also a doctorate in philosophy. During the Second World War, he spent three years in Auschwitz, Dachau, and other concentration camps. For four decades, he made countless lecture tours all over the world and was awarded twenty-nine honorary doctorates from universities in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Africa. He received numerous awards, including the Oskar Pfister Award from the American Psychiatric Association and Honorary Membership in the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Frankl’s thirty-nine books have been published in fifty languages so far. The English version of . . . trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen (Man’s Search for Meaning) achieved sales in the millions and was included in a list of the “Ten Most Influential Books in America.” Viktor E. Frankl died in 1997 in Vienna.
FURTHER WORKS BY VIKTOR E. FRANKL
A complete list of all books by Viktor E. Frankl and a comprehensive bibliography on logotherapy/existential analysis can be found on the website of the Viktor Frankl Institute: www.viktorfrankl.org.
The Doctor and the Soul: From Psychotherapy to Logotherapy. Vintage, 2019.
The Feeling of Meaninglessness. Marquette University Press, 2010.
Logotherapy in a Nutshell (Basic Concepts of LT). Beacon Press, 1962.
Man’s Search for Meaning/Adapted for Young Readers. Beacon Press, 2017.
Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. Beacon Press, 1959.
Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning. Ebury/Rider, 2011.
Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning: A Revised and Extended Edition of The Unconscious God. Plenum/Insight, later Perseus Book Publishing, 1997.
On the Theory and Therapy of Mental Disorders: An Introduction to Logotherapy and Existential Analysis. Brunner-Routledge, 2004.
The Unheard Cry for Meaning: Psychotherapy and Humanism. Simon & Schuster and Hodder & Stoughton, 1979.
Viktor Frankl—Recollections: An Autobiography. Insight Books, Perseus Books Publishing, 1997.
The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy. Penguin-Plume, 2014.
ABOUT THE VIKTOR FRANKL INSTITUTE
The Viktor Frankl Institute (VFI) was founded in Vienna in 1992 by an international circle of colleagues and friends under the aegis of Viktor Frankl. It is a scientific society with the goal of maintaining Viktor Frankl’s work and promoting logotherapy and existential analysis as a psychiatric, psychological and philosophical field of research and as applied psychotherapy. It is also responsible for quality assurance for psychotherapy and counselling training in logotherapy and existential analysis. The Viktor Frankl Institute in Vienna is also the accreditation institution for training in classical logotherapy and existential analysis (following Frankl).
A list of over 150 accredited international institutions and national associations that provide training in logotherapy and existential analysis can be found on the VFI website.
The institute has exclusive access to the Viktor Frankl private archive and houses the world’s largest collection of texts and research on logotherapy and existential analysis.
In 1999, in cooperation with the City of Vienna, the Viktor Frankl Fund of the City of Vienna was founded. In line with its objectives, from 2000 to 2018, the fund awarded annual prizes and scholarships to reward excellence and to promote research projects in the field of meaning-oriented humanistic psychotherapy. In addition, the fund awarded an annual honorary prize in recognition and appreciation of the life’s work of outstanding persons. Previous award winners include Heinz von Foerster, Paul Watzlawick, Cardinal Franz König, Dame Cicely Saunders, Cardinal Óscar Andrés Rodríguez Maradiaga and Eric Richard Kandel.
The institute offers the world’s first state-accredited doctoral degree in logotherapy within the framework of the Viktor Frankl Chair of Philosophy and Psychology at the International Academy of Philosophy (university in the Principality of Liechtenstein). In collaboration with the Department for Logotherapy and Existential Analysis, founded in 2012 at the Moscow Institute of Psychoanalysis in Russia, it also offers a master’s program and psychotherapy training in logotherapy.
Information about the activities of logotherapy institutes around the world can be found on the VFI homepage. In addition to news on logotherapeutic research and practice, it includes a comprehensive bibliography of primary and secondary literature on logotherapy.
