The Pentagon, Climate Change, and War, page 1
THE PENTAGON, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND WAR
Charting the Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Emissions
NETA C. CRAWFORD
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2022 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
The MIT Press would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers who provided comments on drafts of this book. The generous work of academic experts is essential for establishing the authority and quality of our publications. We acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of these otherwise uncredited readers.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.
ISBN: 978-0-262-04748-7
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Contents
INTRODUCTION
I THE DEEP CYCLE
1 SO HUNGRY, SO THIRSTY: COAL, OIL, AND WAR
2 THE LIFE BLOOD AND THE DEEP CYCLE: OIL AND U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE SINCE WORLD WAR II
II THE U.S. MILITARY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
3 CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF COUNTING MILITARY EMISSIONS
4 A GUIDE TO U.S. MILITARY AND MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL EMISSIONS SINCE 1975
III U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
5 ENERGY AND CLIMATE SECURITY: FINDING AND FIXING VULNERABILITIES
6 CLIMATE CHANGE AS “THREAT MULTIPLIER”
IV THE WAY AHEAD
7 A LEAN GREEN FIGHTING MACHINE? MITIGATION VERSUS ADAPTATION
8 THE PATH TO CLIMATE SECURITY
Acknowledgments
Appendix: Estimating U.S. Military Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Abbreviations
Index
List of Figures
Figure 0.1
Overview of GHG protocol scopes and emissions across the value chain.
Figure 1.1
Map of U.S. military bases, 1776–1903.
Figure 1.2
The Great White Fleet departs Hampton Roads, 1907. Photo: Naval Institute Archives, “December 16, 1907: The Great White Fleet Departs Hampton Roads for Circumnavigation,” Naval History Blog, December 16, 2012, U.S. Naval Institute, https://www.navalhistory.org/2012/12/16/december-16-1907-the-great-white-fleet-departs-hampton-roads-for-circumnavigation.
Figure 1.3
U.S. Navy coal purchases, in tons, 1892–1913.
Figure 1.4
British Royal Navy coaling stations in 1914.
Figure 1.5
U.S. domestic production of refined petroleum products, military procurement, and military procurement as a percent of total production, 1939–1945. Military Procurement includes all military purchases of major products both in the United States and foreign countries, plus purchases made abroad for delivery to U.S. ports. Foreign purchases have been variously estimated that from one to four per cent of the total.
Figure 1.6
Comparison of physical volume of mineral production with agricultural, and industrial production and population, 1900–1946. Average productivity from 1935–1939 = 100.
Figure 1.7
Estimated effects of combined bombing on German World War II petroleum production.
Figure 2.1
U.S. Central Command.
Figure 2.2
U.S. troops deployed for Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, March 2014.
Figure 2.3
Operation Inherent Resolve air strikes in Iraq and Syria, 2014–2021.
Figure 2.4
U.S. arms exports, 2016–2020.
Figure 2.5
Institutional deep cycle: oil demand, consumption, militarization, and conflict.
Figure 4.1
Defense Logistics Agency “Worldwide Locations” in 2020.
Figure 4.2
DOD and Total U.S. federal government energy consumption, FY1975–2020, in trillions of British thermal units (BTUs).
Figure 4.3
Major categories of energy consumed by the U.S. government and DOD, FY2020 in billions of British thermal units (BTUs).
Figure 4.4
Total DOD facility energy use, billion BTUs, FY1975–2020, all sources.
Figure 4.5
DOD facility energy use FY1975–2020: coal, fuel oil, and natural gas in billions of BTUs.
Figure 4.6
DOD facilities energy consumption by major type FY2020 in billions of BTUs.
Figure 4.7
Total DOD operational fuel consumption and expenditures, FY2007–2020.
Figure 4.8
Operational energy demand, millions of barrels, FY2007–2020.
Figure 4.9
DOD vehicle fuel consumption in millions of gallons, by major fuels, FY1975–2020. The U.S. military halted use of Navy Special Fuel for ships in 2010. The U.S. Air Force and Army use JP-8 fuel; the navy uses JP-5 fuel. Commercial fuel has been certified for military jets since 2014. Military vehicles also used 593 million gallons of aviation gas and 14 million gallons of liquid propane gas/propane from FY1975–2020. There were also 77,620 BTUs generated for vehicles by “other” unspecified means.
Figure 4.10
Operational energy use by service, domain, and mission, FY2014.
Figure 4.11
Estimated and reported DOD greenhouse gas emissions, million metric tons of CO2e, FY1975–2020.
Figure 4.12
Military jet fuel and diesel emissions, 1990–2020, million metric tons of CO2e.
Figure 4.13
Greenhouse gas emissions of fuel oil, natural gas, and coal at military facilities, 1975–2020 in metric tons, CO2e.
Figure 4.14
Total Scope 1 and 2 metric tons of CO2e emissions of Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics, 2010–2020.
Figure 4.15
The petroleum target system.
Figure 5.1
Attacks on NATO supply convoys through Pakistan, 2008–2014.
Figure 5.2
Outages lasting eight or more hours at DOD installations caused by “acts of nature.”
Figure 5.3
U.S. military assets with climate-related vulnerabilities.
Figure 5.4
U.S. installation at Diego Garcia.
Figure 6.1
DOD map of representative climate change hazards and potential impacts, 2021.
Figure 6.2
National Intelligence Council map of vulnerable countries, 2021.
Figure 7.1
DOD electric and non-electric renewable energy sources, millions of BTUs, FY2010–2020.
Figure 7.2
Alternative energy production and purchases at DOD installations in FY2016.
Figure 7.3
Flooding at Offutt Air Force Base on March 17, 2019.
Figure 8.1
U.S. Navy presence in 2021, carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups.
Figure 8.2
Average daily U.S. petroleum exports and imports, 1960–2020.
Figure 8.3
Fossil fuel and renewable energy consumption in the United States, 1975–2020.
Figure 8.4
Biomass, hydropower, geothermal, solar, and wind energy consumption in the US, 2000–2020.
Figure 8.5
The deep cycle.
Figure 8.6
Department of Energy research and development funding, energy technology share of funding, 1978–2018.
Figure 8.7
U.S. annual CO2 emissions, 1845–2019.
Figure 8.8
DOD annual “base” and “overseas contingency operations” war spending, FY2001–FY2022 in current dollars. FY2001–FY2021 is the authorized amount. FY2022 is the request.
Figure 8.9
U.S. and Chinese military spending, 1990–2020 in constant (2019) U.S. dollars.
Figure 8.10
U.S. defense suppliers earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization, FY2014– FY2019.
Figure A.1
U.S. military spending, in constant 2019 dollars and BTUs per fiscal year.
Figure A.2
Estimate of DOD standard and nonstandard greenhouse gas emissions, millions of metric tons CO2e, FY2000–2020.
List of Tables
Table 0.1
DOD scope 1 and 2 emissions, CO2e, for fiscal years 2010–2019
Table 0.2
Comparison of CO2e emissions of the U.S. military–related emissions with selected country CO2 emissions in 2019
Table 1.1
Characteristics of mid-nineteenth-century U.S. naval steamers
Table 1.2
U.S. production of 100-octane aviation gasoline, 1941–1945, thousands of barrels
Table 2.1
U.S. bases in Middle East and Persian Gulf region, September 2021
Table 3.1
Fuel energy content
Table 3.2
Data from “Table 1.A.5 Other” and “Table 1.D International Aviation and International Navigation (International Bunkers)” and multilateral operations of the 2021 U.S. common reporting format (CRF), emissions data for mobile military emissions
Table 4.1
DOD scope 1 and 2 emissions, CO2e, for Fiscal Years 2010–2019
&
Defense Logistics Agency standard prices: jet fuel, diesel distillates, and gasoline, FY2021
Table 4.3
U.S. military service branch scope 1 and 2 emissions, MTCO2e, installation and operational emissions for fiscal years 2010–2019
Table 4.4
Estimated U.S. military aircraft jet fuel consumption and CO2 emissions
Table 4.5
Aerospace and defense industry employment 2016–2019
Table 4.6
Top U.S. military contractors and arms sales in millions of dollars as a portion of total sales in 2018 and 2019
Table 4.7
Total Lockheed Martin emissions and RECs, in metric tons CO2e (MTCO2e)
Table 4.8
Scope 1 and 2 emissions of top 12 U.S. arms companies in 2019, metric tons CO2e
Table A.1
Emissions for different types of fuel
Table A.2
DOE report of Department of Defense greenhouse gas inventory, CO2e, FY2020
Table A.3
Department of Defense site-delivered energy use and costs, FY2019
Table A.4
Calculating greenhouse gas emissions for U.S. military jet fuel consumption, FY2017
Table A.5
Estimated annual DOD greenhouse gas emissions, FY1975–2018
Table A.6
Rough estimate of DOD and war-related overseas contingency operation greenhouse gas emissions, millions of metric tons CO2e, FY2002–2020
Table A.7
Inventory of transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions (MMTCO2 eq).*
Table A.8
CO2 Emissions from fossil fuel combustion in transportation end-use sector (MMTCO2 eq.)
Table A.9
EPA report of international bunker fuel emissions (MMTCO2).
Table A.10
Direct private sector defense-related employment in the U.S. and portion of total U.S. GDP
INTRODUCTION
“Every tonne of CO2 emissions adds to global warming.”1 There are many ways human activity has put global warming gases—carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated gases, and water vapor—into the atmosphere. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports have consistently warned of potential ecological and social catastrophe if humans fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. For many, the catastrophe has arrived; the world’s forests are on fire, coral reefs are dying, and humans are on the move, fleeing excessive heat and escaping vast zones of too much or too little rainfall.
For more than a decade, the United States national security establishment has been a leader within the federal government in putting aside questions about whether climate change is real to focus on understanding the strategic implications of climate change; policy analysis and doctrine take for granted that global warming is already occurring, that it has and will affect the U.S. military, and that climate change may spark war. Current and former military and intelligence officials, and several think tanks, including the RAND Corporation, the Center for Naval Analysis, and the much newer Center for Climate & Security have consistently raised the alarm about climate change. In 2019, a group of senior military and security experts announced in the Netherlands their formation of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) and began in 2020 to produce annual assessments, called the World Climate and Security Report.2 Members of the national security community have become more urgent in asserting that climate change may cause armed conflicts.3 In 2013, United States Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear II, then chief of United States Pacific Command (renamed Indo-Pacific Command in 2021), stated that instability caused by climate change “is probably the most likely thing that is going to happen … that will cripple the security environment, probably more likely than the other scenarios we all often talk about.”4 Or as one U.S. military officer said to me recently, “People will start fighting over access to water pretty quickly.” Books such as Gwynne Dyer’s Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats and Harald Welzer’s Climate Wars: What People Will Be Killed for in the 21st Century have contributed to a sense of alarm.5
The Biden administration put climate change at the heart of its national security and stressed the potential for climate change caused conflicts. President Biden said, “We will prioritize defense investments in climate resiliency and clean energy.”6 Yet, unlike the scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming and that emissions must be reduced, scholars are divided over the relationship between climate change and war. Adding the mission of responding to potential climate change caused conflicts to the DOD’s already extensive and expensive list of missions will likely increase the military budget and their greenhouse gas emissions.
The greening of the military is important, but little of the analysis has focused on the fact that the U.S. military has historically been a great driver of fossil fuel use and continues to be the largest emitter in the federal government. In fact, although the U.S. military funded some of the first scientific research on global warming and was an early advocate of anticipating and reacting to the threats and challenges posed by climate change, the Pentagon resisted including military emissions during the negotiations that led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. For the first time, the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act required the DOD to produce a report on its greenhouse gas emissions over the previous ten years, and the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act required the administration to produce a plan to reduce DOD emissions.7
Since many who work in my field (international security) are not yet well versed in the language of greenhouse gas emissions, it is important to clarify a few terms of art. The international standard for calculating the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of institutions includes counting emissions through the product cycle of inputs, production, and outputs. Figure 0.1 illustrates the kinds of emissions that are counted for a typical business. In the clouds of this illustration, in order, are the chemical formulas for greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorochemicals (PFCs); and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). CO2 equivalent, or CO2e, is a measure of all greenhouse gases that takes into account the different warming potentials of different greenhouse gases. Although it is not in the illustration, water vapor is also a greenhouse gas. Scope 1 emissions are those directly produced by the institution; scope 2 emissions are those that occur from the production of the electricity and steam power that the institution purchases; and scope 3 emissions are those that occur upstream and downstream of what an organization does—its value chain.
Figure 0.1
Overview of GHG protocol scopes and emissions across the value chain.
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/scope-3-inventory-guidance.
The U.S. military, like all armed forces, emits greenhouse gases directly (scope 1 emissions) when it operates vehicles and consumes fuel at its bases and installations. Emissions also occur when the DOD purchases energy (scope 2 emissions), such as electricity and steam. For a military organization, scope 3 include the goods and services it acquires, employee commuting, employee business travel, and the emissions of leased assets. Downstream emissions include those from waste disposal and the use of its products. A comprehensive understanding of military downstream emissions would include the emissions released as a consequence the use of force, such as when a city or oil infrastructure is bombed, and the emissions associated with reconstruction.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and DOD have reported that U.S. Department of Defense scope 1 and 2 emissions were 54.8 million metric tons of CO2e (MMTCO2e) in fiscal year 2019. Table 0.1 reproduces the DOD’s accounting of its total scope 1 and 2 emissions for 2010–2019, which track surges in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The next year, fiscal year 2020, DOD emissions were lower, 51.5 MMTCO2e.8 This continues a recent trend in reductions in U.S. military greenhouse gas emissions. At the time of this writing, U.S. military greenhouse gas emissions are the largest share—currently about 75 percent—of all U.S. government GHG emissions.
Table 0.1
DOD scope 1 and 2 emissions, CO2e, for fiscal years 2010–2019
The military’s scope 1 and 2 emissions in any one year are just a snapshot of a slice of a larger system. The Department of Energy reported some of the scope 3 emissions for the Department of Defense for a few years—for fiscal years 2008 and 2010–2016. Included in this accounting of scope 3 emissions were transportation and distribution losses, employee air and ground business travel, employee commuting, and contracted wastewater treatment and municipal solid waste disposal. For the years the DOE reported those emissions, they averaged 7.4 MMTCO2e annually.9 The DOE accounting of Department of Defense scope 3 emissions did not include military-industrial emissions or the consequences of military operations abroad.
