On Tactics, page 13
The last aspect of command and control is the designation of a reserve force. A reserve is simply a portion of friendly forces stationed in such a way that they are out of the thickest fighting but able to quickly act if necessary. Typically, the reserve force is prepared to either react to an unforeseen enemy maneuver or to exploit the success of the main effort at a critical time, thus continuing the attack with fresh troops. The reserve, unlike other units, should be committed only on the order of the overall commander. The use of the reserve then offers the commander an advantage of centralized control while providing both flexibility and a hedge against the unforeseen and the culminating point of victory. A reserve force should be heavy enough to make an impact on the enemy but fast enough to react quickly. Cavalry and tank units are ideal in this capacity.
In his book Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Stephen Biddle convincingly posits that the manner in which a military force is employed is a far better determinate of success than whether it has numerical or technological advantages. Effective employment of military force flows from appropriate organization. The concepts discussed here are battle-tested practices that preserve a commander’s ability to affect the battle while fostering the necessary flexibility, tempo, and rapid decision-making necessary to succeed in battle. Brought together and executed by troops trained and educated enough to employ them, they are necessary methods to execute modern tactics.
There is one more vital aspect of using mission command, and it is a limitation. Unfortunately, another timeless aspect of war and warfare is the brutality and callousness that it engenders in human beings. Savagery is unavoidable because warfare rends the fabric of societies and distorts the bonds between and among individuals. The actions of soldiers must be limited by clear and enforced rules of engagement. When making decisions, subordinate commanders must know what is unacceptable under any circumstances, even to attain victory. This is a strategic level function that can never guarantee the absence of war crimes, but it is a necessary control on the actions of troops. Again, it is the tactician who must recognize when an action will hurt the strategy or the long-term emotional health of his troops and prevent such events.
15
ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.
—Sun Tzu
The development of a tactical system in theory is one thing, but in practice tactics will always occur on the ground, the waves, or in the sky. The tactician must translate his mission and his vision for its accomplishment into a plan that can be executed in the real world. It must both mitigate the disadvantages of the terrain and exploit its advantages. The finest tactical coup is useless if the troops cannot execute it. The tactician therefore must take into account the terrain and environment in which he operates. Much like strategy, the effects of the environment are pervasive.
For ground operations, Sun Tzu’s chapters on types of terrain, written centuries ago, almost cannot be improved on. In his chapter 10 he presents six types of ground: accessible, entrapping, indecisive, constricted, precipitous, and distant. These six types relate to the ground and the advantage or disadvantage conferred by it on the military force that occupies it (table 15.1).
Table 15.1 Six Types of Ground
In his chapter 11 Sun Tzu lays out “Nine Varieties of Ground.” There is some overlap with the types listed above. The nine varieties are dispersive, frontier, key, communicating, focal, serious, difficult, encircling, and death. Again, these are not just descriptions of terrain features but a codification of those features as they relate to combat. Death ground, for instance, can be any type of terrain. It exists only when a military force is completely trapped and cannot escape from its enemy. The trapped force will fight harder and with reckless abandon, a recognition of the interaction between the physical and moral planes. The situation means death for both sides. The major difference in the nine varieties is that the sentiments of the local population are taken into account (table 15.2).
Table 15.2 Nine Varieties of Ground
The dynamics of sea state and aviation are too complicated to be described here, but terrain and weather concerns are even more important for sailors and aviators. The sailor must be concerned with winds and tides that can change in an instant and he must be cognizant of the depths below him where submarines might lurk. The aviator cannot fly if weather is contrary, and thus the soldier must also be aware that his air support could be disabled.
A more modern concept when it comes to terrain is the idea of lines of communication. Current U.S. military doctrine defines a line of communication as, “A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.”1 In any case, military forces will be limited in terms of where they can move. Mechanized forces move more easily along road systems and must bypass mountains and rivers. Ships must move on the water, and the water must be deep enough for the hull. Even aviators must be cognizant of air space that is sometimes controlled by civilian authorities. The tactician must be aware of where and how he can move troops and supplies, and can use his knowledge of the enemy’s logistics capabilities to predict where he will move.
The advancement of technology has done nothing to nullify the effects of terrain and weather. American infantrymen in Iraq suffer through sandstorms just like Alexander the Great’s troops did in 331 BC. In the tradition of Sun Tzu, the Chinese used terrain and weather to great effect in 1950 during the Korean War. The UN forces on the Korean peninsula believed the war was won as they approached the Yalu River that forms the border between North Korea and China and Russia. But Mao Zedong (or Tse-Tung)’s People’s Liberation Army would combine effective use of terrain and weather with mass, maneuver, tempo, deception, and surprise to deal U.S. forces one of the worst defeats in their history.
In October 1950 the North Korean communist forces under North Korean premier Kim Il-sung were collapsing. UN forces led by the United States had pushed North Korean forces out of South Korea after breaking the back of their offensive at Inchon in September. The collapse happened so quickly that UN forces were nearing the Chinese and Russian borders, prompting frantic discussions between Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. UN forces were advancing northward along two axes: the western force was the Eighth Army under Lt. Gen. Walton W. Walker and the eastern force was X Corps under Gen. Edward Almond. Both reported to Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo. Due to the rugged and mountainous terrain of Korea, each column was “virtually in isolation from each other.”2 As the troops moved northward, the terrain chopped units up into groups as small as companies, making mutual support difficult or impossible. Additionally, the movements and deployments of UN forces were detailed in the press every step of the way.3
Both China and the Soviet Union were worried that the thus-far victorious UN forces would not stop at the Yalu, but it was China that responded with action. As early as June, Chinese troops under veteran general Lin Paio began moving across the border into North Korea. These troops were further reinforced and, by October, 12,000 troops had crossed into North Korea. By November around 180,000 Chinese troops were in the vicinity of Eighth Army and some 120,000 were near X Corps in the east.
Despite the large numbers of Chinese troops, the UN forces had no idea they were there. The Chinese accomplished this infiltration with a strict deception plan that used the terrain itself. First, China announced that “volunteers” would fight with North Korean forces, but in actuality Chinese forces would fight as units. Mao Zedong even went so far as to rename the Chinese Fourth Field Army as a volunteer unit. Once inside Korea, Chinese units moved into deep valleys to hide from aerial observation. The troops marched only at night and were heavily camouflaged during the day. Soldiers that violated orders to stay hidden were summarily executed. Since the Chinese used no air forces or heavy artillery and very few motorized assets, U.S. Air Force patrols completely missed the troop movements. Finally, taking notes right out of Sun Tzu, the Chinese had some troops defect to UN forces with fake information. Other troops were given false information just in case they were captured.4
UN forces thus continued to attack north in complete ignorance that an entirely new enemy was waiting for them. By late October, Eighth Army units were advancing so fast that they were about to stumble on Chinese forces. On 25 October the Chinese launched a spoiling attack aimed mostly at South Korean and U.S. forces in the west.5 Chinese infantry attacked many units from multiple sides at once. After a week of fighting, Chinese forces disappeared again.
The spoiling attack—called the “first offensive” by the Chinese—halted the Eighth Army advance and sowed confusion in the UN high command. Headquarters in Tokyo still denied that the Chinese forces even existed. When they finally admitted that Chinese units must be in Korea, they estimated that there were 40,000–70,000.6 There were 300,000. MacArthur ordered the advance resumed and even promised the troops that they would be home for Christmas. He assumed that even if Chinese forces were in the area, the firepower of the Air Force would destroy them.
Meanwhile, the Chinese forces were studying the initial fighting. They developed tactics on the spot that would nullify U.S. advantages in combined arms by maneuvering through gaps in UN lines created by the terrain to isolate units and attack them from all sides. Chinese troops, waiting for the weather to turn, were already hidden behind the American forces.7 Lin Paio was waiting for the weather to turn. UN forces had yet to experience a harsh North Korean winter. Chinese forces were inured against the cold and were well-equipped with cold weather clothing. The cold would disable heavy UN equipment and aircraft, but the Chinese forces had none anyway. Temperatures would fall to zero degrees and below, offering an advantage to the better prepared Chinese troops.
On the night of 25/26 November, the Chinese struck.8 During the “second offensive,” Chinese units attacked in columns. Where Chi-nese units struck UN lines, they withdrew. Where they found gaps, they used them to maneuver against exposed flanks. Many U.S. units decimated Chinese units, but most were confronted with overwhelming mass. Most units of the army of South Korea Army disintegrated under the pressure. The retreat of the Eighth Army was facilitated by a Turkish brigade that stayed behind and held the Chinese back for two days before the Chinese destroyed it.
But too many Chinese troops had maneuvered behind UN lines. One Chinese division set up a six-mile-long ambush on the withdrawal route.9 Pyongyang was abandoned as the Chinese harried and harassed the Eighth Army south.
The attack in the east began on the night of 27/28 November with similar results, although United States Marine Corps troops that kept regiments and battalions together with artillery units fared better and held out. Many other units, fragmented by the terrain, collapsed. X Corps retreated east to form a beachhead on the coast. All along the route, Chinese forces set up roadblocks, mined roads, and ambushed the freezing UN troops, exploiting the success of their surprise attack.10
By mid-December, however, the cold weather affected even the Chinese. Soldiers on both sides froze to death, wounded and otherwise. Chinese units were observed avoiding fights with the UN forces.11 X Corps managed to execute an amphibious withdrawal to South Korea and Eighth Army consolidated on the 38th Parallel. On 26 December the Chinese “third offensive” hit Eighth Army, which again retreated, this time losing control of Seoul. (UN forces would retake that city in March 1951.)12
The Chinese attack was a tactical masterwork that demonstrates a number of the concepts laid out herein. Despite the unmitigated success of the UN forces against North Korea, they had reached a culminating point thanks in no small part to MacArthur’s personal hubris. Despite massive American advantages in firepower, the Chinese developed a tactical plan based on maneuver and mass that nullified Allied firepower. The Chinese then executed a detailed deception plan that completely misled U.S. intelligence, leading to complete surprise and confusion among UN forces. The shock of the main attack shattered moral cohesion, especially that of recently formed South Korea formations but also that of some U.S. forces. The attack resembled tactics of guerrillas executed on a large scale, and utilized both terrain and weather to great effect. Chinese forces did not explicitly operate on the tenets of mission command but, since they lacked any kind of radio communication, subordinate commanders were on their own once an attack was launched. The surprise was so total that the UN forces lost the initiative and were on the defense before they even realized it, as demonstrated by the renewed advance after the initial Chinese attacks. Still, UN forces did not break entirely. The Chinese attack culminated in turn and South Korea was preserved.
Many of the best military commanders in history relied on mastery of terrain to succeed. George Washington was a land surveyor as a young man. Napoleon had gigantic maps made that he would crawl over when planning his battles. Robert E. Lee began his career as an engineering officer, well-versed in fortification (recall the discussion of the Battle of Petersburg in chapter 4). The use of terrain, especially when fortified, has not lost its importance across the centuries of military history. Julius Caesar used fortifications to win the Battle of Alesia in 52 BC. The massive artillery firepower brought to bear during World War I could not defeat earthen trenches. In 1956 during Operation Kadesh, Ariel Sharon, then an officer in the Israeli Defense Force, overran Egyptian defensive positions by sending his tanks directly at them with either the rising or setting sun directly behind them, blinding the Egyptian defenders.13 Today ISIS fighters, their Kurdish Peshmerga enemies, and Houthi rebels in Yemen are using trenches to enhance defensive positions and ISIS fighters have even executed successful attacks using the cover of sandstorms. The timeless importance of geography is a lesson and a warning to modern tacticians and another reason why the study of military history is a vital aspect of their education.
16
CROSSING THE BRIDGE
Linking Tactics with Strategy
The musical notes are only five in number but their melodies are so numerous that one cannot hear them all. The primary colors are only five in number but their combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all. The flavors are only five in number but their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all. In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all.
—Sun Tzu
Colin S. Gray describes strategy as a bridge between the tactics that occur on the battlefield and the policy goals that those tactics are intended to secure.1 This is an apt metaphor for the concept. Strategy is a two-way thoroughfare, enabling the necessary modifications of tactics by policymakers to bring them in line with political goals and allowing policymakers to make decisions informed by the practitioners that must strive to achieve those goals. A policymaker who does not understand the capabilities and limitations of the tacticians cannot make effective policy.
The policymakers’ representatives on the tactical side of the river are the commanders at every level, even platoon commanders and NCOs. Just as it is incumbent on the policymakers to understand what can be realistically achieved by the tacticians, it is incumbent on the commanders to employ tactics in times, places, and ways that achieve the goals of policy. Anything less is negligent.
Clausewitz describes the strategic effect on the losing side of a successful tactical victory: “The effect of all this outside the army—on the people and the government—is a sudden collapse of the most anxious expectations, and a complete crushing of self-confidence. This leaves a vacuum that is filled by a corrosively expanding fear which completes the paralysis. It is as if the electrical shock of the main battle had sparked a shock to the whole nervous system of one of the contestants.”2
Notice the prevalence of mental and moral effects in this description. Events on the battlefield do not remain there; they resonate among the defeated army and among the government officials whose policy is now in danger and the people whose soldiers were defeated. War is not won on the battlefield; it is won by the effect of battle on the strategic level. One example is the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam in 1968. The NVA and Viet Cong forces that attacked American forces throughout the country achieved no military objective, but the realization that the allegedly losing communists were still quite capable had far-ranging and outsized mental and moral effects on the American side.
Additionally, tactical victories must be defined. A true tactical victory is won when the cumulative physical and mental means of one side shatters the moral cohesion of the other, as we have seen. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the shattering of moral cohesion is sufficient. It is merely the means to an end that the tactician will further seek through exploitation at the tactical level (which will usually mean the destruction or at least attrition of the enemy force), and the use of the victory for the purpose of the war, to borrow Clausewitz’s phrase.
For tactical victories to be strategically effective they must be aimed at a center of gravity. The concept of a center of gravity is a tendentious one and the use of the term here should not be confused with the tactical concept in use by the U.S. military today. Clausewitz defined the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.”3 Examples include the enemy’s army, his capital, a single commander/sovereign (such as a Napoleon), or even an ideology. It is commonly asserted that Clausewitz believed that the enemy’s army is always the center of gravity. He did not, although he believed that was frequently the case. Napoleon himself did not always correctly identify a center of gravity. In 1812 Napoleon defeated the main Russian army at Borodino and then occupied and burned Moscow, and the Russians did not surrender. Spain never truly capitulated to Napoleon. It is surprising that Clausewitz focused so much on defeating the enemy’s army when it failed for his exemplar strategist.
